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For decades, scientists have warned about the toll humanity’s reliance on fossil 
fuels for energy and transportation is having on our planet’s climate, yet the U.S. federal 
government has been unable to enact a comprehensive climate change policy. In this 
void, there are a growing number of states considering or are already taking their own 
actions on climate change despite facing many of the same barriers encountered at the 
federal level, including the politicization of climate change. While there has been much 
scholarship on why these states choose to take these actions, there is little about what 
might be the best policy route for the states to pursue them. This thesis examines three 
case studies of policy routes used by the different states: a cap-and-trade program in 
California passed by the state legislature, a ballot initiative to add an amendment to 
Michigan's constitution to raise its state renewable energy requirements, and the 
regulatory cooperation between California and the federal government on fuel economy 
and greenhouse gas emission standards for new vehicles. Reviewing the policy under 
consideration itself, how it benefits the climate, why and how the state sought this 
particular action, the policy route through which it was pursued, the deliberation over that 
policy, and the end result, this thesis recommends that unless there are numerous factors 
that support taking action on climate change – including political climate, sufficient 
public education, and a sustained, deliberative process prior to pursuing such a policy – 
states should focus their efforts on regulatory actions that allow for public involvement 
but is deliberative and insular enough that only those who are well-versed on the topic 
and passionate about getting involved in it are part of the actual deliberations. Professors 
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For decades, officials at all levels of government have begun to heed the warning 
of scientists about the toll humanity’s reliance on fossil fuels for energy and 
transportation has had on our planet’s climate. The message from the scientific 
community is near universal: governments must mandate immediate and substantial steps 
to reduce the amount of carbon dioxide, sulfur, and other heat-trapping emissions 
humanity generates to curb the worst impacts of climate change, which can strain 
government resources and lead to political and geographic turmoil.1 
 In fact, a 2013 peer-reviewed paper of 11,944 abstracts of studies and papers 
published between 1991 and 2011 that discussed climate between found 97.1 percent 
agreed on the scientific position that anthropogenic global warming – or human-driven 
climate change -- is real.2 Scientists had been warning about the possibility of rising 
global temperatures since the 1970s,3 but it was not until the1988 formation of the United 
Nations Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change that there was a coordinated, global 
effort to develop strategies to reduce nations’ emissions and take steps to mitigate the 
impacts climate change was already having on the planet. The 1997 Kyoto Protocol, 
which mandated that signatory countries develop policies to limit and reduce their 
greenhouse gas emissions, presented the largest commitment in history to combating 
climate change. But President George W. Bush withdrew the United States from the 
                                                 
1 Shirley V. Scott, "The Securitization of Climate Change in World Politics: How Close have We 
Come and would Full Securitization Enhance the Efficacy of Global Climate Change Policy?" Review Of 
European Community & International Environmental Law. 21, no. 3 (2012): 220-230. 
2 John Cook, Dana Nuccitelli, Sarah A. Green, Mark Richardson, Bärbel Winkler, Rob Painting, 
Robert Way, Peter Jacobs, and Andrew Skuce. "Quantifying the consensus on anthropogenic global 
warming in the scientific literature." Environmental Research Letters 8, no. 2 (2013): 024024. 




treaty in 2001,4 stating that the treaty exempted too many countries from reducing their 
emissions, and since then the country has yet to implement a comprehensive climate 
change policy. While the country came close in 2009 when climate change legislation 
passed in the House of Representatives, it slowly died in the Senate. The failure was the 
result of a myriad of factors that prevented it and other federal efforts to combat climate 
change from moving forward, including politics, money, poor public perception, and the 
media.5 
 In the void left by federal inaction, there are a growing number of states, counties, 
cities, and other subnational governments enacting their own climate change-related 
policies, such as commitments to reduce local emissions, smart growth policies, and 
renewable energy mandates.6 They were able to achieve these actions through a variety of 
policy avenues like voter referendum, their own legislatures, and regulatory actions 
despite facing many of the same barriers that stymied past federal efforts.  
 
State Action on Climate Change 
According to the Center for Climate and Energy Solutions, 20 states and the 
District of Columbia have set targets for reducing their greenhouse gas emissions.7 Most 
are largely voluntary goals that are not enforceable in themselves but serve as a 
foundation to build more binding policies like renewable energy requirements, climate 
                                                 
4 Greg Kahn, "The Fate of the Kyoto Protocol under the Bush Administration," Berkeley J. Int'l L. 
21 (2003): 548. 
5 Shi-Ling Hsu, “A Prediction Market for Climate Outcomes,” University of Colorado Law 
Review. 83, no. 1 (2012): 179-256. 
6 R. Bierbaum et al., "A Comprehensive Review of Climate Adaptation in the United States: More 
than before, but Less than Needed," Mitigation and Adaptation Strategies for Global Change 18, no. 3 
(2013): 361-406. 
7 Center for Climate and Energy Policy," Climate Change 101: State Action," last modified 
January 2011, http://www.c2es.org/science-impacts/climate-change-101/states/. 
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action plans, greenhouse gas registries, and energy efficiency standards that would 
produce those emission reductions. 
While there are many reasons why a state would choose to take on climate 
change, they generally fall into one or more of three main categories.  
The first is local impact, that is, an acute awareness of the impact climate change 
is having on the state’s environment and its resources. In the case of Montana, state 
authorities have already determined that climate change poses a serious risk to the state’s 
water supplies, which can not only have effects on the state’s own water-heavy industries 
like agriculture and livestock production but, as a headwater state, reductions in its water 
supply can have concussive results throughout the region.8 The state enacted standards 
for reducing emissions from its power plants and has been active in multi-jurisdictional 
emission-reduction plans.9 
The second is economic incentive, that is, that the state chose to move forward 
with policies that would not only help combat climate change but also bring economic 
benefits to the state like reducing unemployment and keeping it competitive with other 
states in the growing market for clean energy technologies.10 While not enacting policies 
directly related to climate change, Pennsylvania – a state that saw its dominant steel 
industry evaporate in the past several decades – has made a significant push to develop 
                                                 
8 Climate Change & Water Resources, Montana Department of Environmental Quality, last 
modified May 10, 2011, http://deq.mt.gov/ClimateChange/NaturalResources/Water/water.mcpx. 
9SustainableBusiness.com, "6 States Pull Out of Western Climate Initiative," last modified Nov. 
22, 2011, http://www.sustainablebusiness.com/index.cfm/go/news.display/id/23178. 
10 Steffan Jenner, Gabriel Chan, Rolf Frankenberger, and Mathias Gabel, "What Drives States to 
Support Renewable Energy?" Energy Journal 33, no. 2 (2012): 1-12. 
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policies aimed at encouraging the growth of green-centric businesses like biofuels 
production and energy-efficient technologies.11 
The third, environmental leadership, is the reason on which scholars have focused 
most of their attention. While California faced many of the same local impacts like 
drought as many other states and is home to many businesses that had a strong economic 
interest in combatting climate change, the state and its leaders have always considered 
forward-thing environmental policies as a hallmark of their state’s identity and 
responsible for subsequent policies in other states and at the federal level, so much so that 
it has often been referred to as the “California effect.”12 Citing the lack of federal action, 
leaders like former California Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger chose to make action on 
climate change a central part of their political platforms. Schwarzenegger made climate 
change a priority during his tenure as governor and even after leaving office remains one 
of the world’s leading advocates for policies to combat it.13 
The extent to which these policies have succeeded in reducing individual states’ 
emissions is up for debate. According to one analysis completed in 2010, state-level 
climate actions have reduced greenhouse gases by about a half a metric ton per person 
per year, about 2-3 percent of the 24 tons of emissions the average person produces every 
year due to their energy use, vehicle emissions and other activities.14  
                                                 
11Pennsylvania Climate Action, Center for Climate and Energy Solutions, last modified August 
2013, http://www.c2es.org/us-states-regions/action/pennsylvania. 
12 Richard Perkins and Eric Neumayer, "Does the ‘California effect’ operate across borders? 
Trading-and investing-up in automobile emission standards," Journal of European Public Policy 19, no. 2 
(2012): 217-237. 
13 Protecting the Environment and Promoting Clean Energy, Arnold Schwarzenegger, last 
modified December 2013, http://www.schwarzenegger.com/issues/milestone/protecting-the-environment-
and-promoting-clean-energy. 
14 William J. Drummond, “Statehouse Versus Greenhouse Have State-Level Climate Action 
Planners and Policy Entrepreneurs Reduced Greenhouse gas Emissions?” Journal of the American 
Planning Association, 76, no. 4 (2008). 
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Motivation, Leaders, and Avenues for State Action on Climate Change 
A large body of the research on why the states would take these actions has been 
through the lens of a federalist, bottom-up approach. Some of the studies examined 
whether the primary motivators for states and local bodies to craft their own climate 
policies come from motivations like a desire to be economically competitive with other 
subnational governments,15 while other research has focused on the ability of municipal 
governments to influence state policies.16 Though the conclusions of these studies found 
there are tradeoffs to these approaches,17 they argue that, in time, a federalist approach 
could yield policies that could be adapted to the national level with a federal policy 
establishing minimum standards for emissions and renewable energy that states could 
then decide to meet or exceed.18  
Several studies have focused on the range of action local authorities can take on 
climate change and their cumulative impact. Dr. Rachel Krause at the University of 
Texas at El Paso found that the unique authority that subnational governments have over 
certain areas, including zoning, building codes, and land management, enables these 
bodies to take extensive action that cannot be taken at the federal level.19 Her research 
also found that capacity – rather than outside political forces, organized interests and 
                                                 
15 Kirsten H. Engel, “Whither Subnational Climate Change Initiatives in the Wake of Federal 
Climate Legislation?” Publius 39, no. 3 (2009): 432-454. 
16 Barbara Parsons Fenton, “The Effect of Municipal Initiatives on State Climate Change Plans,” 
Masters Abstracts International 48, no. 01 (2010): 0188. 
17 Gabriel Weil, “Subnational Climate Mitigation Policy: A Framework for Analysis,” Colorado 
Journal of International Environmental Law & Policy 23, no. 2 (2012): 285-307. 
18 Barry G. Rabe, “States on steroids: The intergovernmental odyssey of American climate change 
policy,” Review of Policy Research 25, no. 2 (2008): 105-128. 
19 Rachel M. Krause, “Municipal Involvement in Climate Protection: Local Decision Making and 




other factors – is primarily responsible for the extent of action that local bodies can take 
on climate change.20 
 Additional research has shown that organized citizens,21 non-governmental 
organizations,22 and other policy entrepreneurs play a crucial role in getting these policies 
passed. In the case of Connecticut, which enacted some of the first statewide climate 
policies in the country, one study found that policy entrepreneurs and their framing of the 
issue helped drive this action, but acknowledges that the unique nature of Connecticut 
politics (where the characteristics of state Republicans is far more centrist than in other 
parts of the country) played a large role in getting the policy passed.23  
 
The Polarization of Climate Change 
 Another major factor to consider is how climate change itself became such a 
wedge issue in American politics, in part because of the communications barrier to 
educating and selling the public on the need to take action to combat climate change.  
To combat climate change will require changes that could upset the economic and 
political balance of established systems for energy production, manufacturing, and urban 
development. These tradeoffs can be beneficial in the long run,24 but the threat to those 
established interests has led different powers in politics, business, and society as a whole 
                                                 
20 Rachel M. Krause, “Political Decision-making and the Local Provision of Public Goods: The 
Case of Municipal Climate Protection in the US,” Urban Studies 49, no. 11 (2012): 2399-2417. 
21 Elaine B. Sharp, Dorothy M. Daley, and Michael S. Lynch, “Understanding Local Adoption and 
Implementation of Climate Change Mitigation Policy,” Urban Affairs Review 47, no. 3 (2011): 433-457. 
22 Iati Iati, “The Potential of Civil Society in Climate Change Adaptation Strategies,” Political 
Science 60, no. 1 (2008): 19-30. 
23 Mark A. Boyer, “Global Climate Change and Local Action: Understanding the Connecticut 
Policy Trajectory,” International Studies Perspectives 14, no. 1 (2013): 79-107. 
24 Louise W. Bedsworth and Ellen Hanak, “Adaptation to Climate Change: A Review of 




to make climate change a wedge issue25 that makes responding to it a matter of 
socioeconomic class26 and a value judgment, rather than on scientific evidence alone.27 
 The polarization of the issue of climate change has pointed researchers to focus 
on the media narrative that helps drives citizens’ “acceptance” of the phenomenon,28 the 
two main tactics used by opponents to climate change action – distortion and provoking 
uncertainty about the science when the large majority of scientific research concludes it is 
a reality and a threat to the planet.29 
This strategy has been effective, with research showing the U.S. media more 
likely to portray the issue of climate change as more controversial and uncertain than 
media in other developed countries.30 Research published in The Sociological Quarterly 
in 2011 concluded that the politicization and polarization of climate change rose sharply 
between 2001 and 2010 in part because of political leaning of the news sources from 
which the public was receiving its information on climate change, concluding that 
“liberals and Democrats are more likely to report beliefs consistent with the scientific 
consensus and express personal concern about global warming than are conservatives and 
Republicans.”31 In fact, additional research exploring the messaging power that 
                                                 
25 Deborah Lynn Guber, “A Cooling Climate for Change? Party Polarization and the Politics of 
Global Warming,” American Behavioral Scientist 57, no. 1(2013): 93-115. 
26 Thomas Laidley, “Climate, Class and Culture: Political Issues as Cultural Signifiers in the US,” 
Sociological Review, 61, no. 1 (2013): 153-171. 
27 Karin Edvardsson Bjornberg and Sven Ove Hansson, “Five Areas of Value Judgment in Local 
Adaptation to Climate Change,” Local Government Studies. 37, no. 6(2011): 671-687. 
28 P. Sol Hart and Erik C. Nisbet, "Boomerang effects in science communication: How motivated 
reasoning and identity cues amplify opinion polarization about climate mitigation 
policies," Communication Research (2011), doi: 10.1177/0093650211416646. 
29 Robert J. Hinrichs, “Arguing Global Warming: The Reception and Uses of Climate Change 
Science,” Dissertation Abstracts International, Section A: The Humanities and Social Sciences 69, no. 09 
(2009): 3393. 
30 Jacqueline M. Dispensa and Robert J. Brulle, “Media’s Social Construction of Environmental 
Issues,” International Journal of Sociology and Social Policy 23(2003):74–105. 
31 A. M. McCright and R. E. Dunlap, “The politicization of climate change and polarization in the 
American public's views of global warming, 2001–2010,” The Sociological Quarterly, 52 (2011): 155–194. 
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proponents of action on climate change must harness in order to effectively fight back 
opponents notes that because the message of opponents to action on climate change is 
simplified, they’ve been able to be more effective in mobilizing disinterested and less 
educated citizens to oppose proposed action on climate change. 32 
 
The Right Policy Route for State Action on Climate Change 
The scholarship focused on U.S. climate adaptation has focused mainly on a 
national solution and local responses, but research is lacking on a clear roadmap for other 
states to achieve these kinds of climate victories and what factors are necessary for those 
successes. This thesis aims to explore that question by analyzing the motivation behind 
the states’ desire to pursue these policies, and the effectiveness of their chosen policy 
routes. 
 To explore this question, each of the three chapters will examine a different kind 
of climate policy at the state level, each of which had its own policy route. The first 
chapter examines the development and passage of California’s climate law by its state 
legislature, the second will focus on a 2012 ballot initiative in Michigan to raise the 
state’s renewable energy standard, while the third studies a California regulatory decision 
about whether to participate in a federal fuel economy and climate change emissions 
standards for new vehicles.  
 Each of this thesis’s three chapters will discuss the policy itself, and how it 
benefits the climate, why and how the state sought this particular step, the deliberation 
over the policy, and the end result.  
                                                 
32 Caren Cooper, “Media Literacy as a Key Strategy Toward Improving Public Acceptance of 
Climate Change Science,” BioScience 61, no. 3(2011): 231-237. 
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 Understanding why and how these states pursued these policies but also the policy 
route they chose is critical to understanding whether other states – in the absence of 
federal action – are able to take their own action on climate change and, if so, what is the 
best path forward. 
 This thesis will be a useful contribution to scholarship on state-level climate 
change policies and their interaction with actions at the federal level. Specifically, this 
thesis will provide previously unexplored lessons about the particular policy routes that 
would be best for states interested in enacting their own climate policies. Understanding 
these policy routes would provide a detailed list of factors for state proponents of climate 
policies to consider before acting, as well as allow federal observers to better predict 













Chapter 1 – California’s AB 32: A Case Study of 
the First U.S. Cap-and-Trade Policy Passed by a 
State Legislature 
 
 On Sept. 26, 2006, lawmakers, advocates, scientists and citizens from across the 
state of California stood under a grey sky on a shoreline along San Francisco’s Treasure 
Island and watched Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger sign Assembly Bill 32 (AB 32),  
the landmark 2006 state law that enacted the country’s first binding limit on emissions 
that contribute to climate change.33 Proclaiming that the bill represents “a bold new era of 
environmental protection here in California that will change the course of history,”34 the 
governor said AB 32 will help lower the climate change emissions that drive climate 
change from a state ranked the world’s 8th largest economy as of 2014.35 
 What the governor signed into law was something that until recent years seemed 
impossible to establish in the United States: a climate law with enforceable limits for 
reducing greenhouse gas emissions and the authority to create a market for exchanging 
credits for those emissions reductions. The challenge was large for the state, which is 
responsible for 1.4 percent of the world’s greenhouse gas emissions and 6.2 percent of 
the emissions generated in the United States, as was the scope of the proposal. The law 
called for the California Air Resources Board (CARB) to develop a plan that would 
reduce emissions in the state to 1990 levels – a 30 percent reduction – by 2020,36 with the 
                                                 
33 Assembly Bill No. 32 (Cal. 2006), http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/05-06/bill/asm/ab_0001-
0050/ab_32_bill_20060927_chaptered.pdf. 
34 Mark Martin, "Governor signs measure to cap greenhouse gas emissions -- sweeping changes 
predicted in industries and life in cities," San Francisco Chronicle, Sept. 28, 2010, http://www.sfgate.com/. 
35 Justin Garosi and Jason Sisney, "California is the World's Eighth Largest Economy," California 
Legislative Analyst's Office, December 4, 2014, http://www.lao.ga.gov. 




longer-term goal established by executive orders from Schwarzenegger37 and his 
successor Governor Jerry Brown38 of an 80 percent reduction below 1990 levels by 
2050.39  
Since 2006, the state has made great strides toward this goal. It launched what it 
described as "the most comprehensive cap-and-trade program in the world"40 in 2012, 
expanded its reach in 2014 when it officially linked up with Canada’s Québec province’s 
own program,41 and continues to host regular credit auctions, despite several legal 
challenges and even an attempted repeal. In 2010, more than 60 percent of California 
voters rejected a ballot initiative known as Proposition 23 – backed largely by two Texas-
based oil companies42 -- that would have suspended the law until California’s rate of 
unemployment was at or below 5.5 percent for four quarters in a row.43 
This is not the first mandatory cap-and-trade program in the country. The 
Northeast’s Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, or RGGI, was announced a year before 
and began emissions auctions in 2008. However, there is a key difference between it and 
AB 32 that sets the latter apart is its’ supporters and opponents in the California 
Assembly and their respective allies had to make their case to the governor, industry, 
                                                 
37 California Climate Change Executive Orders, California Climate Change Portal, last modified 
April 25, 2012, http://www.climatechange.ca.gov/state/executive_orders.html. 
38 Edmund G. Brown Jr., "Executive Order B-16-2012," State of California, last modified March 
23, 2012, http://www.ca.gov/. 
39 G. Stemp-Morlock, "Climate change. California's 2020 vision," Environmental Health 
Perspectives 117, no. 3 (2009): A103. 
40 State of California, Climate Change Scoping Plan: First Update, Prepared by the California Air 
Resources Board, October 2013. 
41 Auction and Reserve Sale Information, California Air Resources Board, last modified March 5, 
2015, http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/capandtrade/auction/auction.htm. 
42 California Proposition 23, the Suspension of AB 32 (2010), BallotPedia, accessed April 30, 
2015, http://ballotpedia.org/. 
43 California's Proposition 23 -- The Dirty Energy proposition, Union of Concerned Scientists, 
accessed March 13, 2015, http://www.ucsusa.org/. 
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environmentalists, public health advocates, lawmakers, and the public before it could 
become a reality.  
The bill was vague in its original form for how it would achieve its goal, merely 
setting a target for the state’s emissions reductions that lined up with Schwarzenegger’s 
executive order,44 leaving legislators room to hammer out an equitable method for 
achieving these goals that would pass through the state Assembly and get the approval of 
the governor. The division for how to proceed fell in three distinct camps: those wanting 
a straight, binding cap on emissions with no market mechanism for trading (the argument 
being that a market would not achieve the reductions necessary); those wanting a 
voluntary reductions program with incentives for industries to reduce their emissions; and 
those wanting a cap-and-trade program that would set caps on emissions but allow 
polluters to trade emissions credits. The bill’s authors originally leaned toward a straight 
cap on emissions45 while Schwarzenegger remained neutral on the bill but indicated a 
preference for a cap-and-trade program.46  
This law represents the successful passage and implementation of a legally 
binding policy to reduce the emissions that drive climate change through a deliberative, 
legislative process in a country where awareness of climate change as an issue and its 
perceived threat is lower compared to many other industrialized nations.47 
                                                 
44 Arnold Schwarzenegger, "Executive Order S-3-05," State of California, last modified June 1, 
2005, http://www.dot.ca.gov/hq/energy/ExecOrderS-3-05.htm. 
45 Mark Martin, “Governor to focus on global warming, Critics question his resolve on an issue 
dear to green voters,” San Francisco Chronicle, April 10, 2006, http://www.sfgate.com/. 
46 “Emissions-trading standoff threatens passage of GHG measure,” Inside Cal/EPA, August 25, 
2006, https://environmentalnewsstand.com/Inside-Cal/EPA/Inside-Cal/. 
47 Anita Pugliese and Julie Ray, "Gallup Presents…A Heated Debate," Harvard International 
Review 31, no. 3 (Fall 2009): 64-68. 
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 But how AB 32 was able to cross the finish line when other proposals, including 
many at the national and international level, have failed requires an examination of the 
effectiveness of a cap-and-trade regime, why the state sought to take action on climate 
change, proponents’ ability to push such an ambitious plan through a state legislature, 
and what policy entrepreneurs did to ensure the bill’s success.  
  My hypothesis is that proponents took advantage of a unique moment in the 
state’s political climate that included a pro-environment Republican governor and 
high political will to tackle climate change to successfully leverage passage of the 
bill. 
 
The Rise of Cap-and-Trade 
Long before California sough to curtail its contribution to climate with the 
enactment of AB 32, economists wrangled with the idea of an economic approach to 
reducing pollution. Since the 1950s, when the environmental impact of rapid economic 
growth was starting to be felt in air and water quality, economists have explored a market 
alternative to the binding caps on pollution. In 1960, economist Ronald Coase postulated 
that if property rights were made transferable, the market would determine the worth of 
these rights and they would naturally gravitate to their use.48 Two economists, John 
Dales49 and Thomas Crocker,50 published papers that showed this theory’s applicability 
                                                 
48 R. Coase, “The Problem of Social Cost,” Journal of Law and Economics 3 (October 1960): 1-
44. 
49 J.H. Dales. Pollution, Property and Prices (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1966). 
50 T.D. Crocker, “The Structuring of Atmospheric Pollution Control Systems,” The Economics of 
Air Pollution, (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1966). 
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to water and air pollution, respectively, and are generally credited for developing the 
intellectual framework for a system of emissions trading.51  
This theory was expanded upon to a certain degree with changes to the 
implementation of the Clean Air Act. In the years following the enactment of the 1970 
law, which expanded on the original 1963 law and imposed binding deadlines for regions 
to meet ambient air quality standards, it became clear that certain regions would not be 
able to reach the deadlines under the act and would be designated “nonattainment” 
regions, meaning that businesses that would create any emissions that would contribute to 
that status would be prohibited from moving into the region. To curtail backlash from 
mayors, governors, businesses, and members of Congress from these nonattainment 
regions, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) encouraged existing sources 
of pollution in these areas to voluntarily reduce their emissions and, once certified by the 
federal agency, could transfer the reductions as credits to new sources of pollution that 
wished to move into these areas. Those sources, however, had to attain enough credits so 
that their move into a nonattainment region would result in a lower total regional 
emissions than before they moved in. Economist Tom Tietenberg said that this system 
“not only allowed economic growth while improving air quality – the original objective – 
it made economic growth the vehicle for improving the air. It turned the problem on its 
head and made the problem part of the solution,” 52 a solution the EPA would continue to 
                                                 
51 Elizabeth Dickinson, "Capping It Off: How a concept became an environmental policy 
catchphrase," Foreign Policy, March/April 2010, http://www.foreignpolicy.com. 
52 Tom Tietenberg, "Cap-and-Trade: The Evolution of an Economic Idea," Agricultural and 
Resource Economics Review 39, no. 3 (2010): 359-367.  
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expand upon with a series of amendments to the Clean Air Act in 197753 and would soon 
be put to the test as the nation sought to address acid rain. 
During the 1970s, researchers were observing a precipitous decline in plant and 
animal life in the eastern United States. Tree die-offs that would take entire forests, fish 
stocks in lakes nearly depleted, and other impacts were widespread across the region. 
Research showed that the high emissions of sulfur dioxide and to a lesser extent nitrogen 
oxides, both primarily generated by coal-fired power production and other industrial 
practices, was causing rain and snow to become more acidic, killing aquatic, plant, and 
animal life that came into contact with it.54 Lawmakers, industry, and scientists debated 
how to combat this growing acid deposition, or “acid rain” as the phenomenon was 
commonly known. They debated between a straight, enforceable cap, a tax on the 
emissions themselves, and a trading system akin to how the EPA had administered its 
nonattainment regions. In 1980, Congress passed the Acid Precipitation Act, which set 
out a 10-year research effort to determine how best to respond to it. The result of that 
research and the advice of advocates like the Environmental Defense Fund was the 1990 
update to the Clean Air Act, which included among other things a 10-million-ton 
reduction in sulfur dioxide emissions – about half of total emissions at the time – from 
1980 levels, with 8.5 million tons of those reductions coming from electric utilities.55 
Polluters were given allowances for the emissions, but the act included a cap-and-trade 
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mechanism for polluting industries that lowered their emissions more than required to sell 
their additional allowances.  
The results were impressive. Between 1990 and 2004, sulfur dioxide emissions 
dropped 36 percent even as coal-fired power plant energy production rose by 25 percent 
during that same period.56 While ecosystem recovery can take decades to reveal itself, 
there is some initial evidence that those systems most impacted by acid rain are starting 
to recover. The benefits have been extensive for public health, with estimates showing 
the reduced particulates from sulfur dioxide pollution saving the country more than $50 
billion per year in health costs by 2010. The program was implemented at a fraction of 
$25-billion-a-year cost the EPA originally estimated, with an industry organization and 
an independent think tank both estimating in 1998 the annual cost by 2010 to be less than 
$2 billion. “In sum, the [sulfur dioxide] allowance-trading system’s actual costs, even if 
they exceeded the cost-effective ideal for a cap-and-trade system, were much lower than 
would have been incurred with a comparable traditional regulatory approach, and were 
much lower than the trading system’s predicted costs,” concluded researchers at the 
Harvard Environmental Economics Program in a policy brief on the success of the 
program, adding that “there is broad agreement that the [sulfur dioxide] allowance-
trading system provided a compelling demonstration of the cost advantages of a market-
based approach.”57 
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 The success of the country’s acid rain program remains the best example of a 
market-based solution backed by regulatory standards for achieving its environmental 
goal, a model that was later successfully used to help curb the emissions that created the 
hole in the ozone layer with the development of the Montreal Protocol.58 The model 
seemed perfect for addressing the far-larger problem of reducing the emissions of carbon 
dioxide and other greenhouse gases that drive climate change. In 1997, shortly before 
countries around the world would meet in Kyoto, Japan to negotiate a binding 
international treaty to combat climate change, the Clinton administration unveiled an 
emissions trading proposal to broad support.59 The negotiations were successful in Japan, 
with nearly all of the world’s countries becoming parties to the Kyoto Protocol, an 
agreement placing limits on developed countries’ emissions like the United States that are 
considered primarily responsible for the majority of the emissions in the atmosphere,60 
but despite the support the international community was throwing behind this treaty, it 
did not enjoy the same support in the United States Senate. By a vote of 95-0, the Senate 
passed a non-binding resolution against the protocol, stating that the Kyoto Protocol 
“would result in serious harm to the economy of the United States,” among other 
potential harms.61 Facing this kind of blanket opposition, President Clinton signed on to 
the treaty but never submitted it for ratification by the Senate. In 2001, President Bush 
withdrew the United States from the treaty altogether in favor of an alternative, voluntary 
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proposal to provide tax credits for polluters that reduce their emissions through use of 
renewable energy.62 This decision dimmed the prospects of a national cap-and-trade 
program that only once more came within striking distance with the failed 2009 House 
cap-and-trade bill.  
 
California’s Unique Place in Environmental Regulation 
 To understand how California was able to achieve a cap-and-trade bill despite 
many of the challenges that faced past climate policies requires an understanding of the 
state’s unique role in the history of environmental issues, in particular the challenges and 
opportunities the state has encountered with air pollution. As the country’s third-largest 
state by land mass and largest by population,63 California has a rich array of 
environments ranging from snowy mountain ranges to sweeping farmlands to populous 
urban centers. But in 2006 the state was also home to five out of the 10 cities with the 
worst year-round particle pollution in the country,64 and the state’s environmental 
problems were even worse in past decades. To combat the stifling air pollution problem – 
the result of vehicle emissions, industrial operations and coal-fired power production – 
the state chose to move forward with its own environmental protections rather than wait 
for the federal government. In 1965, the state became the first in the nation to regulate 
smog-forming emissions from vehicles, and two years later created CARB, an 11-
member department under the California Environmental Protection Agency tasked with 
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working with businesses, local governments, and community groups to find solutions to 
California’s air pollution problems.65 Some scholars have since attributed the board’s 
regulatory latitude as part of the reason for the state’s climate successes.66 
Recognizing the extent of California’s air pollution problems, Congress granted 
the state the authority to set air pollution standards in excess of federal standards, an 
authority first introduced in the Federal Air Quality Act of 1967 and established as part of 
amendments to the Clean Air Act. With this authority, the state took steps to lower the 
particulate pollution produced by vehicles sold in the state. These standards became the 
basis for the first federal emissions standards in the 1970s, and several states – acting 
under a unique provision of the Clean Air Act – adopted California’s standards over the 
federal minimums on vehicle emissions.67  
 Up until the early 2000s, the state’s actions were largely focused at smog-form air 
particulates like sulfur dioxide and nitrogen oxides spewed by vehicles, but in 2002, 
Governor Gray Davis signed legislation to begin one of the first efforts a state had ever 
taken to mandate reductions in greenhouse gases like carbon dioxide that drive climate 
change. The law, AB 1493, called on CARB to develop limits for vehicles’ greenhouse 
gas emissions starting with model year 2009. Eleven other states chose to adopt these 
standards. The legal wrangling to allow California – which had to seek permission from 
the EPA each time it wanted to exceed federal standards – to establish these standards, 
and the effort by it and other states to regulate greenhouse gases, was ultimately settled 
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by the Supreme Court’s landmark 2007 ruling in Massachusetts v. EPA. The case 
centered on whether the EPA had the authority under the Clean Air Act to regulate 
greenhouse gas emissions. The EPA during the administration of President George W. 
Bush asserted that it did not have that authority, while Massachusetts and several other 
states and municipalities – including California – asserted that because greenhouse gas 
emissions and the climate change they drive present a serious threat to human health, 
they could be a classified as air pollutants and thus the agency has the ability and 
responsibility to regulate them under the Clean Air Act. The court sided with the states, 
writing in its ruling that “greenhouse gases fit well within the [Clean Air Act’s] capacious 
definition of air pollutant.”68 The success of California, which was ultimately granted the 
authority by the EPA to regulate vehicles’ greenhouse gas emissions in 2009 during the 
Obama administration after delays by the Bush administration’s EPA, had put the state at 
the vanguard of combatting environmental problems, as well as made it an example for 
other states to follow. Even the federal government has taken its cue from California, 
working with the state to establish the first federal rise in fuel economy and emissions 
standards for new passenger vehicles in decades.69 This regulatory route effort will be 
examined in a later chapter.  
 Part of California’s success has come from the strong state identity of being a 
leader on environmental issues and from the advocates for those issues. Many nonprofits 
have focused their efforts in California in large part because a success in California – a 
state with the political will and regulatory ability to be a laboratory of democracy for 
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innovative environmental policies – may serve as a template for success at the national 
level later.70 Many had worked in the state for years to lay the groundwork for 
California’s action in AB 32. In 1999, the Massachusetts-based Union of Concerned 
Scientists that just a few years before had established an office in Berkeley, California, 
issued a report entitled Confronting Climate Change in California,71 the first in a series 
of reports that sought to demonstrate the effect climate change was having on the state 
and the necessity to confront it. The state’s Resources secretary at the time said the report 
represented “solid science to confirm the existence of climate change and establish its 
relevancy to the state.”72 That same year, the state and 11 others would begin legal action 
to regulate carbon dioxide under the Clean Air Act, action that would eventually lead to 
the Supreme Court’s Massachusetts v. EPA decision.73 
The role of the state’s leaders has been important, especially for AB 32 and action 
on climate change. Governor Davis, who served as governor from 1999 until he was 
recalled in 2003, had a strong track record on environmental issues during his tenure. In 
addition to laying the groundwork for the country’s first vehicle greenhouse gas 
standards, under Davis tenure the state purchased 10,000 acres for urban parks and 
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enacted legislation establishing a target for 20 percent of the state’s energy to come from 
renewables by 2017.74 
His successor, Governor Schwarzenegger, campaigned on addressing climate 
change and sought to take action in an area he saw the federal government lacking. He 
recruited California energy strategist Tom Tamminen to design a climate and energy plan 
during his campaign,75 which served as the initial template for AB 32. After taking office, 
Schwarzenegger issued a series of executive orders related to tackling climate change, 
including promoting the use of clean vehicle technology and solar energy. In 2005, he 
issued an executive order that got the ball rolling on the state’s climate change law. It 
established targets for reducing California’s greenhouse gas emissions that called for 
emissions to fall to 2000 levels by 2010, 1990 levels by 2020, and finally 80 percent 
below 1990 levels by 2050.76 
 
Introduction, Deliberation, and Passage 
 Despite the series of variables that favored passage of a strong climate change law 
in California, support for action was not universal when the bill was first introduced in 
early April 2006. Automakers had already been fighting the state’s standards for 
regulating greenhouse gas emissions from vehicles, Republican lawmakers in the state 
assembly largely opposed the bill, and the fossil fuels industry and some business groups 
like the Chamber of Commerce were set to be some of AB 32 fiercest opponents. The 
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business community as a whole was split on the bill, with some seeing it as the genesis 
for a new wave of green technology and energy development that could bring money and 
jobs to the state, and others believing it would drive up costs and force companies and 
jobs out of California. 
 But what worked in AB 32’s favor was its wider range of proponents. There were 
a large variety of policy entrepreneurs advocating for the bill, including the bill’s authors 
– Assembly Speaker Fabian Nunez (D-Los Angeles) and Assemblywoman Fran Pavley 
(D-Woodland Hills) – environmentalists, utility spokespeople, economists, and public 
health advocates.  
 Schwarzenegger, though he remained publically neutral on the bill, stood a lot to 
gain from the bill’s success. He was up for reelection that fall, and the passage of a 
comprehensive climate change bill would help boost his credentials with state voters, the 
majority of which typically vote Democratic.  
With Democrats in control of both the state Assembly and Senate and a pro-
business Republican in the governor’s mansion, sponsors faced the Goldilocks 
conundrum, producing a bill strong enough to get the approval of Democratic bloc in 
both chambers but not so aggressive in its approach as to push Schwarzenegger into 
vetoing the law. The crux lies in forming a bill that would both satisfy the desires of 
environmentalists – who wanted ambitious targets backed by a strong regulatory power – 
and business leaders – who feared too strong of a bill would drive business out of state. A 
key element of the debate would be if and by how much the bill would rely on the issuing 
and trading of pollution credits that would allow companies that cleaned up their act to 
sell those credits to other companies so they would not have to reduce as much of their 
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own emissions. Schwarzenegger insisted a cap-and-trade scheme be a part of the bill, 
along with a provision granting the governor authority to suspend the program during 
times of emergency or economic downturn, but environmentalists were concerned that 
too much reliance on these credits would come at the expense of other, previously proven 
emissions-cutting steps like renewable energy technologies and conservation.77  
While the actual deliberations over the final version of the bill that the state 
legislature would vote on were occurring behind closed doors, those same deliberations 
were also playing out in part in the public.  
Proponents did not shy away from discussing the economic and environmental 
impacts climate change would have on the state. Upon introducing the legislation, Nunez 
told the Contra Costa Times that “if left unchecked, global warming threatens our air 
quality; it threatens our water supply; it threatens our coastlines, and our public health,” 
adding that it “also threatens the reliability of our power grid and some of the state's 
largest and most important industries such as agriculture, skiing, forestry and tourism."78 
Opponents were not averse to evoking these themes either. A spokesman for the Chamber 
of Commerce told the San Gabriele Valley Tribune that “we fear it would have a very 
damaging effect on our state's economy with very little benefit for our global 
environment,” adding that the bill would “increase energy costs dramatically."79  
Both sides would use arguments about the economic impacts of AB 32 to put 
pressure on state lawmakers throughout the summer. In June, the California Chamber of 
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Commerce, the California Manufacturers and Technology Association, and more than 20 
other trade groups began running radio ads statewide telling lawmakers to oppose the 
bill,80 while 44 of the state’s top economists signed a joint letter urging the bill’s passage, 
saying that climate change presents a serious, long-term economic threat and that taking 
action now would produce the best economic benefits for California.81 
 While talk of regulations and legal challenges had been routinely part of the 
arsenal for opponents of climate policies on the federal effort, they were key elements for 
both sides of the debate in California. Proponents were quick to argue that only with a 
strong regulatory structure would meaningful reductions in the state’s emissions occur,82 
while opponents said the very same structure would drive business out of the state.83 The 
emphasis on the regulatory aspects of AB 32 were consistent with concerns about 
regulation commonly echoed about environmental and other protections at the national 
level, but also were a reflection of the state’s recent history with the deregulation of its 
energy markets attributed to the state’s energy crisis in the early 2000s. Some business 
groups characterized the bill as being “full of public policy twists, turns and political 
guesswork that bode serious consequences for the state's economy and consumers – just 
like AB 1890, the poorly considered deregulation legislation that left us with the worst 
energy crisis in history not so long ago."84 
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 Both sides recognized that – like with past environmental policies – California 
had a legacy of leading by example for the rest of the nation that needed to continue. This 
was not just because of the state’s history as a leader on the environment but also an 
indictment against the federal government and its inability to take action in climate 
change. Speaking to the Los Angeles Times that August, Severin Borenstein - director of 
the University of California Energy Institute in Berkeley - said that "there are costs for 
reducing greenhouse gases, but if California can get on board, it might be able to 
demonstrate that those costs are not tremendously high … and the rest of the United 
States might follow along."85 Even opponents were quick to point to California as a 
leader, though their framing was more about warning against the state setting a bad 
example for the rest of the country or otherwise interfering with what they saw was a 
problem in need of a national solution.86  
 Rarely was the actual science of climate change or partisan politics evoked during 
deliberations. Two reasons could account for this. First, the political makeup of the state 
was more inclined to act on environmental issues than on the national level – such as 
having the state’s Republican governor championing action on climate change in general 
if not this bill specifically – made polarizing the issue as a Democrat-versus-Republican 
one less viable than it would be at the national level.87 Second, the state’s previous 
actions on climate change – including its actions to reduce emissions from vehicles and 
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boost its clean tech industry – have established a precedent for the necessity to address 
the threat that was being targeted by AB 32.88  
 Proponents of the climate bill had public opinion on their side. That July, polling 
from the Public Policy Institute of California found that more than six in 10 Californians 
(63 percent) believed the effects of climate change was already underway, more than 
adults at the national level (58 percent).89 Eight in 10 Californians also responded that 
climate change would be a very or somewhat serious threat to the future of California’s 
way of life and economy. While less than half the respondents believed California’s was 
doing a good job in responding to climate change, 65 percent of all adults and 70 percent 
of likely voters believed the state should enact its own policies on climate change, in 
large part due to low satisfaction with action at the federal level.90  
 Despite these varying arguments and large overall support for some kind of action 
on the part of the state, by the end of the summer, no clear consensus had come forward 
and the chance for a finalized bill – and Schwarzenegger’s quest for reelection – were in 
doubt. The Legislature ended its session for the year on August 31, and a week before 
this deadline, Nunez said he and the governor’s office we’re still negotiating on the bill.91 
Some were questioning whether a final bill would happen or whether they would let the 
effort die, but less than 36 hours before the Legislature was expected to adjourn, the 
sponsors and the governor’s office reached an agreement.92 The bill required major 
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industries to reach emission reduction targets though a combination of emissions credits 
trading and emissions-reduction technologies. The bill also directed CARB to develop 
and manage the cap-and-trade program. The administration had sought broad authority 
over the system under the bill, but the final version kept oversight solely with CARB. It 
did give the governor the authority to suspend the program under extreme circumstances, 
but only for a period of one year. On August 30th, the state Senate voted 23-14 to approve 
AB 32, followed by a 47-32 vote in the state Assembly the next day.93 
 
Recommendations and Conclusion 
 In November 2012, after six years of scoping, development, and planning, 
California’s cap-and-trade program officially went online and held its first emissions 
auction. 
Policy entrepreneurs and other proponents of action on climate change hope these 
efforts will eventually link up with other regional schemes like RGGI and lay the 
foundation for what could eventually be a national system. Indeed, some scholars have 
said that this bottom-up approach is the only way to establish a system necessary to effect 
meaningful reductions in emissions nationwide.94  
 But if other states want to achieve similar action through their own legislatures, 
the lessons of AB 32 show that a number of different factors must line up to make a 
policy as aggressive and comprehensive as cap-and-trade a reality. 
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The first is political climate. The proposal came at a time when the majority of 
members in both legislative chambers were Democrats, and there was a Republican 
governor with the desire and will to move forward with an ambitious climate policy. It 
also came at a time when the political climate of the country as a whole was moving 
increasingly Democratic after six years of the George W. Bush presidency. The 
Republican Party held power in the White House and in Congress, and the public was 
increasingly pessimistic about the state of the environment and Republicans efforts to 
protect it. One survey showed just 21 percent of Americans approved of the president’s 
handling of the environment, and just 15 percent approved of Congress’s handling of it.95 
This public sentiment against Washington made for prime opportunity for a state to take 
its own action.  
The second is the proper groundwork. While California has always been more 
aggressive on environmental protections than most states, it is unlikely that sponsors 
would have been able to propose this without all the work that was done in advance. For 
California, that included former Governor Davis’s law calling on the state to reign in 
carbon emissions from vehicles, establishing that the state wanted to make addressing 
climate change a priority. Schwarzenegger’s executive orders then cleared the way for 
the state to take action through the legislature. Amidst these two major actions was a 
consistent drumbeat for years by environmental groups, health experts, scientists, 
economists, and everyday citizens issuing reports, running public forums, and elevating 
this issue within the state. If a state is going to take such an aggressive action, citizens 
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and lawmakers need to feel that is the natural product of a long and thorough discussion 
about what needs to be done.  
The third is the willingness of both sides to compromise. When dealing with a 
sweeping policy that would impact every person and interest in California, the most 
ardent advocates of a climate bill wanting a straight cap on emission and the most ardent 
critics wanting voluntary, market-based reductions are never going to find themselves at 
a place where one is happy to go along with the other. The ability for both sides to come 
to an equitable agreement that includes elements of, if not all of, both sides demands 
allowed for not only the bill’s passage, but a shared ownership of AB 32 and its future.  
The fourth is timing. The economy was in a relatively good place, making such an 
ambitious plan more palatable to a public that –regardless of political persuasion – is 
generally adverse to what could be a large and costly government venture. Public 
awareness about the impacts of climate change was high at the time amongst California 
voters,96 Former Vice President Al Gore’s documentary An Inconvenient Truth came out 
earlier that summer, and the Supreme Court decided that June to hear Massachusetts v. 
EPA. These and other factors, though not all necessary, helped build a sense of awareness 
and urgency to addressing climate change.  
Ultimately, however, it may come down to political will. California has always 
had the will to address its own environmental problems. Capitalizing on that theme, for 
both the bill’s sponsors and the governor, made leading on addressing climate change not 
just a matter of urgency but also of pride. As Schwarzenegger said after he left office 
about California’s climate leaders: “We’ve always tried to show leadership on the 
                                                 




subnational level. Since the United States was not coming to agreement on anything, we 
didn’t want to wait. So we moved. But it’s not something that is for 38 million people. 
It’s supposed to have an effect worldwide. Because if we do well as a subnational 
government, then other governments are going to feel that they can also venture out and 
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Chapter 2 – The Defeat of Michigan’s 2012 
Renewable Energy Proposal: A Case Study on 
Constitutional Amendments as a Policy Route for 
Combatting Climate Change 
 
One of the most popular policy routes that states have chosen to reduce their 
emissions –a renewable energy standard (RES) – was put to Michigan voters in 2012 
when they were asked to approve a statewide mandate for a significant portion of the 
power generated in the state to come from renewable sources such as wind and solar. 
That mandate would come via Proposal 3, an item on the ballot that fall to add an 
amendment to the Michigan constitution requiring the state’s utilities to obtain 25 percent 
of their power from renewables by 2025. 
In the months leading up to the November 2012 election, proponents of renewable 
energy seemed well positioned to pull off an upset. Despite early doubts that proponents 
could even get the proposal on the ballot, Proposal 3 was not only being put to the voters 
for consideration on Election Day but appeared headed for success. A poll taken that 
September showed 55 percent of Michigan voters polled supported the proposal, while 34 
percent were against it and 11 percent remained undecided.98 
The stakes were high for Proposal 3, one of the most high-profile environmental 
ballot items Americans would vote on during that presidential election year. For those 
outside Michigan, the proposal was a test of whether state voters could successfully enact 
a RES via a voter-approved amendment to a state constitution at a time when many state 
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legislatures were hesitant or outright hostile toward such standards, an opposition often 
stoked by right-leaning political groups like the American Legislative Exchange Council 
that actively sought to block these proposals at the state level.99 
 Proponents were optimistic, but as Election Day approached, the tides had turned 
against Proposal 3, with one poll finding only 35 percent of residents supporting it with 
55 percent against, a near-complete flip from three months before.100  
Despite early support by voters, by the time the polls closed on Nov. 6, 64 percent 
of Michigan voters chose to reject the proposed amendment.101  
Some attributed the sheer difference in spending by the two sides as the primary 
reason for the measure’s failure. Proposal 3 would become the second-most expensive 
ballot initiative in Michigan that year. Proponents of the measure – organized under the 
coalition “Michigan Energy, Michigan Jobs” that included a wide array of environmental 
groups, trade associations and labor unions – raised nearly $14 million through the course 
of the election, according to the Michigan Campaign Finance Network.102 Despite this 
sizable war chest, opponents to Proposal 3 had more funds at their disposal. Operating 
under the name “Clean Affordable Renewable Energy (CARE),” state utilities like DTE 
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Energy and Consumers Energy along with other members of the energy and 
manufacturing industries spent more than $25 million to defeat Proposal 3.103   
Despite this huge inequity in spending, most commentators noted that it was not 
the merits of Proposal 3 that sealed its fate but its method. While voters may have wanted 
more renewable energy and the benefits that come with them, they were not ready to 
change the state constitution to do so. As the Detroit Free Press said in its editorial 
opposing Proposal 3, “almost everything about this plan is admirable except the idea of 
locking it into the state Constitution.”104  
 It would be easy to say that the proponents were simply outgunned by a better-
financed utility industry, but if a majority of the state was supporting a constitutional 
amendment just a few months before, how did things turn around so much and how can 
other states avoid the same mistakes? 
The answer lies in how useful an RES is for combatting climate change, the route 
by which proponents sought to enact this RES, the utility of using a state’s constitution to 
change energy policy, how well both sides made their respective cases and how those 
arguments played out with the voters in Michigan.105  
My hypothesis is that supporters were not able to effectively demonstrate to 
voters that amending the state’s constitution was the only way to achieve the 
renewable energy goals proposed in the ballot initiative.   
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Background on Proposal 3 and the History of Renewable Energy Standards 
Just four years before Michigan voters would choose to reject Proposal 3, the state 
legislature passed a law calling for Michigan’s utilities to generate 10 percent of their 
electricity from renewables by 2015.106 Observers attributed this standard to the surge not 
just in Michigan’s renewable energy generation but also the benefits that came with it. As 
of 2012, the state got 5.4 percent of its power from renewable sources – up from 1 
percent in 2008 when the law was passed – and is expected to easily meet its 2015 
deadline.107 The Michigan Public Service Commission estimates that the standard has 
brought $2.2 billion in new investment to the state through 2013 while generating 
thousands of new jobs, mostly in the wind industry. Meanwhile, most state utilities – 
thanks to the lowering costs of deploying this technology – have eliminated their initial 
surcharge to consumers to pay for the new generating capacity.   
Still, of the 29 states that by 2012 had instituted a RES of some kind, Michigan’s 
was among the lowest,108 and Proposal 3 sought to change that. The potential benefits and 
costs of increasing the state requirement to 25 percent varied widely, depending on who 
was asked. One study from the pro-Proposal 3 Michigan Environmental Council found 
that the measure would cost ratepayers an additional 50 cents per month – far below the 1 
percent cap on rate increases included in the amendment – while stabilizing and reducing 
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rates in the long term.109 Another report from the Mackinac Center for Public Policy – a 
conservative think tank in Michigan – found rates would go up between 7-8.6 percent.110 
A third study funded by neither opponents nor proponents of Proposal 3 found that – 
depending on how it would be implemented if passed and the fate of federal renewable 
energy subsidies – the rates would rise anywhere between 3-11 percent.111  
“It seems to be considerably less exciting than all the drama on either side. It’s not 
going to bankrupt Michigan and it’s not free either,” said Elisabeth Moyer, director of the 
University of Chicago’s Center for Robust Decision Making on Climate and Energy 
Policy and author of the third report.112 
 As of December 2012, just a month after Proposal 3 failed, 29 states and the 
District of Columbia had some form of an RES.113 Generally, these policies are similar in 
design: a requirement for retail electric suppliers and utilities in that state to provide a 
certain amount of renewable energy by producing it themselves or bringing it in from 
other states, some form of a credit program so utilities with higher renewable energy 
production can trade extra credits with utilities that are not in compliance with the 
standard, and some form of penalty for those utilities that do not comply.  
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Aside from those principles, the standards and goals are as varied as the states that 
instituted them. Some set percentage requirements, while others called for a minimal 
number of megawatts of generation. Some set smaller goals in the short term like 
Michigan, while other states like Hawaii set a longer and larger goals.114 Some included 
provisions for energy efficiency and credits for existing renewable energy generated in 
the state, while others prohibited utilities from passing the cost of compliance to the 
customer.  
Michigan’s Proposal 3 was somewhere in the middle with its goal and had many 
of the common RES requirements. According to the language as it appeared on the ballot, 
the measure – if it passed – would “require electric utilities to provide at least 25 percent 
of their annual retail sales of electricity from renewable energy sources, which are wind, 
solar, biomass, and hydropower, by 2025; a limit of no more than a 1 percent per year 
electric utility rate increases charged to consumers to comply with the RES; allow annual 
extensions of the deadline to meet the 25 percent standard in order to prevent rate 
increases over the 1 percent limit; and require the legislature to enact additional laws to 
encourage the use of Michigan made equipment and employment of Michigan 
residents.”115  
Most other states’ renewable energy policies came from their state legislatures, 
though some came initially through regulatory action as was the case in New York and 
Arizona.116 Colorado’s RES was the first in the country to come to fruition through 
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popular vote. In 2004, at a time when the traditionally red state was turning more of a 
shade of purple (President Bush won the state that election with just 52 percent of the 
vote while voters elected the state’s first Democratic senator since 1993), 117 voters 
approved Ballot Initiative 37, which required utilities in the state to generate 3 percent of 
their power from renewable sources like wind and solar by 2007 and increase that ratio to 
10 percent by 2015.  
 "Reducing our nation and our state's reliance on foreign energy is an issue that 
should cross all party lines," state Rep. Lola Spradley, a Republican whose renewable 
energy bill earlier that year was the fourth of its kind state lawmakers had rejected, said 
after the ballot measure’s passing.118  
 But how effective is a state-level RES at expanding renewable energy production 
and in some small way reducing humanity’s contribution to climate change? The 
conclusions of research on the effectiveness of different renewable energy policies have 
varied but in general have found a positive correlation between a state policy or law and 
the expansion of renewable power sources in the state.119 These policies are often more 
effective for expansion than other methods like electric retail choice programs provided 
by state energy restructuring, both of which can actually have a negative effect on clean 
energy growth in a state.120 However, other research found that while an RES is effective 
in helping expand overall renewable energy generation in a state, it may not significantly 
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increase the ratio of renewable energy to other sources in a state’s total energy 
portfolio.121  
As a climate policy, research has shown an RES to have some effectiveness for 
reducing emissions, but may not be as effective at combatting climate change as a 
national carbon limit or tax.122 The design of the RES is also an important factor in the 
expansion of renewable energy in a state, with one study finding that including existing 
renewable sources in a state under an RES can actually discourage new development if 
the parameters of the proposed RES are already being largely met it.123  
The effectiveness of any of these policies, if enacted, depends on the different 
contexts – including social, political, and natural resource availability – they are 
adopted.124 But research also shows political climate and support for the policies may 
threaten the effectiveness of even a well-designed policy, regardless of whether it passed 
through regulation, state legislative action, or the voters.125 Even if there is a desire and 
opportunity to pass a RES, responding to climate change may not be an explicit reason 
for doing so. Often, these policies are proposed and adopted with a variety of focuses, 
most notably job growth and non-climate focused environmental issues like clean air or 
water. As one scholar noted about the 2008 Michigan RES adoption, improved air quality 
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was the law’s fourth expressed purpose, while climate change is not mentioned.”126 This 
tactic seems to have been embraced by the authors of Proposal 3, who focused less on 
environmental benefits and more on protections for ratepayers and ensuring the 
technology needed to meet the standard be developed in the state.127  
But what motivates a state to adopt an RES, and why would proponents choose to 
go the voter route? One set of research examined the motivation behind a state adopting 
an RES by testing whether a state’s likelihood to adopt such a policy was driven and 
could be predicted by the internal determinants model, meaning state policy driven by the 
state’s own characteristics, or regional diffusion, meaning the state’s decision to adopt the 
standard is influenced by neighboring states taking similar action. The research showed 
that the internal determinants of the state – including degree of civil liberalism, air 
quality, and ability to capitalize on renewable energy sources like wind and solar – were a 
better indicator of adopting a standard than regional diffusion. 128 
Another study found that high rates of education followed by political party and 
gross state product were likely to have the largest impact on whether a state would adopt 
an RES.129  
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State Constitutions as a Policy Route for Climate Change 
For Proposal 3, pushing the higher renewables standard through an amendment to 
the state constitution was a means to circumvent a state legislature that was largely 
resistant to boosting the existing RES requirement. In Michigan, a state citizen can 
initiate a proposed state statute, but even if that citizen gets enough signatures, it still 
must go to the state legislature, which then must adopt it within 40 days.130 If the 
legislature rejects the bill or takes no action, it then appears on the next general election 
ballot. The legislature could also opt instead to propose an alternative version of the 
proposal, after which both proposals are put to voters on the next general election ballot, 
leaving proponents with having to manage two different proposals, one of which may be 
considerably weaker. But with a constitutional amendment, which has a much higher 
threshold of signatures to get on the ballot (equivalent to 10 percent of the total votes cast 
in the last election for governor as opposed to 8 percent for statutes) a single, voter-driven 
proposal is put directly to the people. 
It was still, nonetheless, a gamble, one that was contingent in how much citizens 
would be willing to change the state’s must foundational document. The state 
periodically reconsiders its constitutions and on three previous occasions has adopted 
new versions since its founding in 1835. 131 Its fourth and current constitution as of 2012 
was adopted in 1963 and includes 12 articles touching on basic rights, structure of 
government, education, and taxation. Since its adoption, 36 out of 81 proposed 
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amendments132 have been added to Michigan’s constitution, spanning issues ranging 
from trial by jury to the sale of lottery tickets. 
In 2012, voters were asked to add five amendments to Michigan’s constitution, 
more that had ever been considered in any past election since its adoption in 1963. Along 
with Proposal 3, the amendments on the ballot included a proposal allowing employees to 
organize and collectively bargain as unions and another requiring a majority of state 
voters to consent to the construction of new international bridges and tunnels from the 
state to Canada.133 
The nature of state constitutions has changed since the country’s founding, 
evolving from broad, vague statements of principles to specific, prescriptive documents. 
Michigan and 17 other states permit citizens to amend their state constitutions via ballot 
initiatives,134 but beyond the varying number of steps each state requires before an 
initiative can appear on the ballot, since they are driven by citizens, they constitute a form 
of direct democracy. Direct democracy as a tool in the citizenry toolbox is a relatively 
new development for Americans, first gaining steam in the early 20th century. In 1911, 
California became the first state to adopt a ballot-initiative process.135 Because the 
structure of both the states and federal governments are based on a democratic republic 
model, whereby citizens elect lawmakers to act on their behalf in most matters, the role 
of this kind of direct democracy is often debated.  
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Detractors contend that without the filter of a representative body, states are more 
vulnerable to drastic and sometimes ill-conceived policy changes. James Madison 
himself noted in Federalist 63 that the major distinction between American democracy 
and the classical democracies of ancient Greece “lies in the total exclusion of the people, 
in their collective capacity.”136 In some cases, the whims of voters may hinder the 
progress a society is slowly making on crucial issues. One analysis, focusing on the 
higher use of civil rights-focused voter initiatives in the latter half of the 20th century, 
found that these referendums were widely used to restrict civil rights at a time when 
support of these rights – including gay rights, housing rights, and the rights of persons 
with AIDS – was growing. The analysis found that of the 74 initiatives on state and local 
ballots throughout the country between 1959 and 1993 that sought to restrict these civil 
rights initiatives, 78 percent were approved even though voters only approved of a third 
of all initiatives and referenda – civil rights-focused or otherwise – proposed during the 
same time period.137 
The stakes are even higher when considering an amendment to the state’s 
constitution, as one researcher noted, in part because voters may not have the capacity to 
properly interpret and consent to a proposal that could have serious constitutional 
ramifications for the state. The researcher argued that, in order to prevent such 
constitutional crises and overcome inherent electoral problems like low-voter turnout, the 
process for voter-driven amendments to a state constitution should be more cumbersome 
so as to make the process more deliberative and better reflective of the popular will of all 
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a state’s citizens rather than just those highly motivated individuals who pushed for these 
proposals.138 
Supporters say voter initiatives and other forms of direct democracy are essential 
to our democracy as a whole, especially when those elected to represent voters’ interests 
stop doing so. As Harvard political scientist William Munro noted during the rise of 
direct democracy in the United States, “The first argument in favor of direct legislation 
rests, accordingly, upon the allegation that existing legislative methods and results are 
unsatisfactory to the majority of the electorate; that representatives do not properly 
represent.”139 
 Proponents said that it was the very lack of responsiveness by the governor and 
the state legislature that was a major driver behind Proposal 3. As one observer wrote 
about a 2006 RES initiative in Washington state, this tactic of voter-driven initiatives to 
address environmental and other concerns is most common when the “controlling 
government fails to address pressing concerns, addresses concerns at a gradual rate that 
renders any action ultimately ineffective, or enacts legislation that simply fails to 
adequately address popular concerns.”140 This approach seems all the more necessary as 
some research suggests that even if voters take on an issue through an initiative, 
amendment, or other direct measure – whether they succeed or not – it is not likely to 
make lawmakers’ more responsive to policy needs like addressing climate change.141 
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 But despite proponents believing that lawmakers were not responding to what 
they perceived as a major threat to the state, pushing their proposal via the constitutional 
amendment route would prove to be a costly and ultimately fruitless endeavor.  
 
The Campaign for and Defeat of Proposal 3 
At its core, the defeat of Proposal 3 laid in proponents’ inability to successfully 
argue why amending the state constitution was the only way to increase Michigan’s 
renewable energy requirements. This did not mean that voters were against the principles 
of Proposal 3, indeed, there was broad support by voters that year for renewable energy. 
The American Wind Energy Association – the wind industry’s national trade group – 
released exit polling that showed that of those who voted against Proposal 3, only 1 
percent of those polled were actually opposed to expanding renewable energy production 
in the state but 60 percent did not want to change the state constitution to get that 
additional energy.142  
Three findings from the campaign of Proposal 3 provide some understanding for 
why voters decided to reject the ballot initiative. The first was that proponents were very 
narrow in their messaging, making a concerted effort to focus on the economic benefits 
of Proposal 3 and not actively focus on either the environmental benefits of the standard 
or the necessity for a constitutional amendment. The second was that the opposition was 
able to position itself as being in favor of renewable energy – though concerned with the 
technical feasibility of expanding beyond the existing RES – while framing the debate on 
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whether it was appropriate to use a constitutional amendment to advance this kind of 
policy. This move, as the third finding reveals, left proponents unprepared for how to 
counter the opposition’s constitutional argument and make the case that Proposal 3 was a 
better course of action for raising the state’s RES rather than by going through the state 
legislature.  
 The first finding about the economic argument proponents would focus on 
through their campaign is evident in one of the first major comments by the spokesperson 
for the coalition supporting the proposed amendment, Mark Fisk, just after the Michigan 
Board of Canvassers’ certified that Proposal 3 would be on the ballot that fall. 
 “Michigan voters are one step closer to supporting a proposal that will create 
94,000 Michigan jobs, rebuild Michigan manufacturing, protect public health and get 
Michigan's economy moving forward again,” he said. “Michigan is falling behind in the 
clean energy race while other states are moving forward and attracting good 
manufacturing jobs. By passing this proposal, Michigan can compete for those jobs and 
put our citizens back to work."143  
This strategy extended beyond the bill’s primary supporters to outside validators, 
including former President Bill Clinton, who cited the economic benefits to Michigan and 
the need to keep it competitive against other states with more aggressive renewable 
energy policies.144 
 Even proponents that were plainly environmental in nature kept their public 
support of Proposal 3 on these themes. Hugh McDiarmid Jr., communications director of 
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the Michigan Environmental Council, said that “renewable energy is a growth industry 
globally, nationally and in Michigan. Michigan has the talent, manufacturing capacity 
and skills to be a national leader in this field."145 While an implicit connection can be 
made that an organization like McDiarmid’s would support something like Proposal 3 for 
its environmental benefits, it reveals a concerted effort by proponents to stay away from 
themes like the environment that have traditionally been very polarizing and instead have 
a narrowly focused message that focused almost exclusively on Proposal 3’s economic 
potential almost entirely on the economy. This narrow focus also included very little 
discussion by proponents about using the state constitution to achieve their objective. 
 The problem, as the second major finding revealed, is that the state utilities that 
made up the opposition to Proposal 3 were able to emphatically – if not genuinely – 
proclaim that they fully supported renewable energy development. The fact that they 
were already adhering to a state legislature-approved RES was evidence enough of their 
support, as one of the opposition’s main spokespeople – DTE executive and CARE 
spokeswoman Nancy Moody – told MLive, a media consortium that covers numerous 
media outlets throughout the state. Speaking a couple weeks before the election, Moody 
said that hers and other utilities make money off of renewables and were happy to adhere 
to the “measured” standard passed by the state legislature but were very concerned about 
a mandate in the state constitution. "The legislative process is a lengthy one, but it should 
                                                 




be," Moody said. "This is a constitutional amendment. Once you have the amendment, it 
is tough to go back to change the constitution. It is very inflexible."146 
 This theme of feasibility was often coupled with the constitutional theme as the 
opposition made the argument that the utilities should not be bound to a constitutional 
mandate when the technological resources were not readily available, a position often 
contested by proponents. "Even though it might benefit our company, we look at the 
bigger picture," said Jeff Woolman, president of OnSite Energy, told the Flint Journal. 
"We don't need it in our constitution. We see companies are already doing what the 
proposal wants done,” adding that Proposal 3 could hurt companies trying to meet the 
existing standard.147 
 The opposition was also able to capitalize on the presence of four other proposed 
changes to the state constitution on the November ballot to stoke concern about Proposal 
3 with the electorate. Governor Rick Snyder, a Republican who opposed Proposal 3, 
often said it and the other proposed amendments were a bad direction for Michigan. In a 
statement on Proposal 3 to the Michigan Chronicle that echoed similar sentiments he had 
with the other proposals (the story itself was titled “Gov. Snyder encourages voters to 
reject all but Proposal 1 on Election Day”), Snyder said it was a “terrible idea” for the 
proposal to be included in the constitution, especially since it was unknown at the time 
what would happen with renewable energy legislation at the federal level.148 
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 Whether they were to trying to downplay significance of it or simply did not see it 
to be that big of an issue, the proponents were not prepared to proactively make their case 
that the only way for Michigan to achieve the renewable energy goals of Proposal 3 was 
by amending the state’s constitution. While the opposition first discussed the 
constitutional ramifications of Proposal 3 shortly after it was certified to be on the ballot 
that fall (the Lansing City Pulse quoted Attorney General Bill Schuette as calling the 
proposal an "end run" around the legislature's right to design energy policy for the 
state),149 the proponents did not make a direct argument on behalf of the constitutional 
merits of the proposal for more than a month, when Proposal 3 spokesman Mark Fisk 
characterized the state legislature as being the “Three Stooges willing to protect the status 
quo and utility company profits at all costs” and that a constitutional amendment was the 
only way to give the public itself a chance to decide Michigan’s energy future.150  
 Even though the proponents discussed the constitutional ramifications of Proposal 
3, their posture was defensive, reacting more to criticism than making their own proactive 
case for why a constitutional amendment was the only option. A few days before the 
election, a story on MLive reported that: “Michigan State Conference NAACP President 
Yvonne White said some people have questioned writing a renewable energy requirement 
into the state Constitution, but legislators have not been responsive to calls for cleaner 
energy. ‘We chose to take on that task because of the health impact that has on 
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communities of color,’ she said. ‘When you don't have people doing things you want 
them to do, the only answer is through the ballot box.’”151 
 Proponents would also often point out that the amendment would leave it to the 
state legislature to determine how best to implement Proposal 3 were it to become a 
reality, but they did little to assuage the fears being stoked by the opposition that the 
state’s constitution – its most fundamental document – was being amended to include this 
policy. In the final days before the election, it was clear that the proponents understood 
the gravity of their situation, especially given the other constitutional proposals on the 
ballot. “If you include the broader 'no' campaign, it's more like four-to-one … It's a much 
more complicated ballot environment than I think we were expecting,” said Navin Nayak, 
senior vice president for campaigns at the League of Conservation Voters.152 
 The resistance by voters to change the state’s constitution was clearly held in their 
ballots as they rejected all five proposed constitutional amendments.153  
 
Recommendations and Conclusion 
While there can certainly be many reasons offered by both sides for the proposal’s 
fate, it is clear that it faced significant challenges that proponents of environmental policy 
had yet to encounter in past efforts across the country. If other climate policy 
entrepreneurs want to pass aggressive renewable energy or similar climate-related 
                                                 
151 Megan Hart, "Muskegon NAACP holds panel discussion in support of Proposal 3 for 
renewable energy," MLive, November 1, 2012, 
http://www.mlive.com/news/muskegon/index.ssf/2012/11/muskegon_naacp_holds_panel_dis.html. 
152 Chad Livengood, "Support for EM law is gaining momentum," Detroit News, November 1, 
2012, http://www.detroitnews.com/. 
153 Paul Egan and John Gallagher, "Message from Michigan voters: Leave our constitution alone," 
Detroit Free Press, November 7, 2012, http://www.freep.com /. 
51 
 
policies like this through the voters at the state level, there are valuable lessons that can 
be derived from these findings to help inform those efforts. 
First, if proponents are going to propose a constitutional amendment or ballot 
initiative as a means to enact policy, they need to clearly and proactively state why this is 
the best choice, a tall order under normal circumstances. Clearly there was evidence that 
the state legislature was ardently against expanding the RES, but little of the proponents’ 
arguments were framed around that opposition. Rather than frame the debate as the 
people taking a step against a stalwart legislature, there is little evidence that proponents 
were prepared to answer why this had to be an amendment at all. If policy entrepreneurs 
are to take a proposal like this to the people, the reason why those citizens must bypass 
the state legislators they elected and pass such a policy – especially if it involves 
modifying the state’s guiding document – must be central to their narrative.  
Second, if they want to use an amendment to the state constitution to enact such a 
policy, the amendment itself needs to be more prescriptive. As several critics of the 
policy noted, the vague nature of the amendment – while intended to give the state broad 
authority over how to comply with it – made it difficult to defend against criticisms about 
how the state would comply with the amendment in specific situations like an economic 
downtown. For such a simple goal to prescribe to, how to reach that goal requires a lot 
more detail, more than could probably be included in the constitution that is arguably not 
meant to be a prescriptive policy document but rather the state’s codification of its core 
principles.  
Third, if they are going to go for such a proposal, they must be strategic about 
their timing. In 2012, Michigan voters were asked to put five amendments on the state’s 
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constitution at a time when anti-government sentiment and opposition to liberal-cast 
causes like clean energy were still lingering from the 2010 election that brought the rise 
of the Tea Party and a new wave of highly partisan sentiment throughout the American 
politic. Additionally, the country as a whole and Michigan in particular were still 
recovering from the effects of the Great Recession, and while proponents saw this as an 
opportunity sell the proposal as bringing jobs to the state, opponents were able to stoke 
the wariness already felt by most state residents about how their fragile economy could 
upend as a result of this proposal. Given that the state legislature had passed a smaller 
RES just two years before that was not even halfway to its deadline of 2015 when 
Proposal 3 appeared on the ballot, proponents were hard pressed to make a case for why 
this larger proposal should supersede the first one so quickly. To make that argument 
would require a forceful statement about the failings of the legislature and the utilities to 
live up to its obligations under the 2010 standard.  
Those failings must be coupled with the fourth major lesson: urgency. While 
much of the rhetoric warned about Michigan falling behind other industrial states in the 
potential economic gold mine of renewable energy development, the policy entrepreneurs 
must clearly explain how the state will miss out – either by using specific examples like 
monetary value or jobs on a specific project that may be lost  – if it does not enact this 
standard. A possible strategy might be securing the commitment of a prominent leader or 
company in the field of renewable energy to establish a manufacturing base within the 
state should it pass such a standard. When the effect is tangible and not an abstract 




Indeed, one body of research that examined concerns about climate change 
against positive- and negative-framed issues found that when that concern is high, the 
framing makes little difference, while at low level of concern the negative framing will 
have far greater effect than a positive-framed message. More specifically, the researchers 
concluded, “results indicate that promoting the potential consequences of inaction more 
strongly affect sustainable consumer intentions than the potential consequences of taking 
action,” including on public policy.154  
Since the defeat of Proposal 3, both Democrats and Republicans in the Michigan 
legislature have discussed a possible successor to its original 2010 RES. A report by the 
Union of Concerned Scientists concluded that the state could meet a third of its electricity 
needs with renewables by 2030 with nearly zero costs to consumers, a growth in the 
state’s electric grid that would create jobs and boost the state’s industry.155 Ambitious and 
far off like Proposal 3, the analysis shows a radical change for Michigan’s economic and 
energy future. Governor Snyder had said he is committed to a “no regrets” energy future 
by 2025,156 but what that future will look like – for the time being – will be left up to the 
state legislature. Those seeking to enact more immediate change through the voters will 
need to heed the lessons of Proposal 3 and evaluate how they make their case to them.  
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Chapter 3 – California Clears the Air on Clean 
Cars: A Case Study of Federal-State Regulatory 
Coordination on Fuel Economy and Climate 
Emissions 
 
Toward summer’s end in 2011, automobile manufacturers, environmentalists, 
labor unions, health advocates, regulators, and policymakers from coast to coast were 
waiting, waiting for an announcement they knew was coming but the substance of which 
was unknown. Coming soon from President Obama’s administration would be what was 
already being projected as the single-largest step his or any other administration had 
taken to reduce the country’s contribution to global climate change: significantly higher 
fuel economy and greenhouse gas emission standards for new cars and light trucks. These 
vehicles, the very same the majority of Americans own and drive every day, account for 
the majority of the vehicles on U.S. roads and about 61 percent of the greenhouse gas 
emissions generated by the transportation sector – which accounts for more than a quarter 
of all U.S. greenhouse gas emissions – every day.157  
The path to this announcement had been forged for nearly a decade, but aside 
from what the final standard would be, there was the question of whether California 
would go along with these standards. The state, which for decades has been a leader both 
in the nation and throughout the world for clean air innovation, had already taken one of 
the boldest steps forward toward combatting climate change with its own climate law. If 
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the state felt the federal goal was not ambitious enough, it could – thanks to existing 
federal law that allowed the state to set its own greenhouse gas emissions standards for 
vehicles – choose to disregard this federal goal and set a higher greenhouse gas standard 
for itself that automakers would have to reach in order to sell vehicles in the state. The 
prospect of a singular, national standard for fuel economy but two standards for 
greenhouse gas emissions – a national one and a California one – was distasteful to 
automakers and worrisome for the administration, which saw California’s cooperation as 
integral to the standards’ success.  
On July 29, 2011, President Obama stood with the leaders of America’s 13 largest 
automobile manufacturers that together account for 90 percent of the passenger vehicles 
sold in the United States to announce their cooperation with the new federal fuel 
economy goal that would reduce fleetwide average climate change emissions for new 
cars and light trucks by model year (MY) 2025 to 163 grams per mile – equivalent to 
54.5 miles per gallon (mpg) if met with fuel economy improvements alone.158 
“Using less oil also means our cars will produce fewer emissions,” he told the 
assembled crowd. “So when your kids are biking around the neighborhood, they’ll be 
breathing less pollution and fewer toxins. It means we’re doing more to protect our air 
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and water. And it means we’re reducing the carbon pollution that threatens our climate.” 
159 
He was also able to announce that California would participate in the standards, declaring 
that the state “has consistently been a leader on this issue.”  
California had significant leverage over the fate of the standards given that it was 
not necessarily bound to implement the same standard set by the federal government 
through its own channels. As one observer noted in 2012 after the new standards were 
finalized, “California and the states that follow it represent 40 percent of the new car 
market … That’s why you’ve seen such support from the automakers for an integrated 
rule.”160 While the final rating was less than the highest possible rating that federal 
regulators had considered, the fact that the deal had the support of federal regulators, 
automobile manufacturers, labor unions, health advocates, environmental groups, and the 
state of California showed a unique moment of state and federal cooperation on 
combatting climate change. But the deal also presents an interesting question: why would 
California, which had the regulatory authority and demonstrated desire to combat climate 
change in excess of federal efforts, choose instead to go along with a less effective, 
national standard? 
To examine this question requires a review of state regulations influencing federal 
policy, the evolution of vehicle emissions standards, the effectiveness of cooperation 
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between federal, state, and private entities on regulation, and how California positioned 
itself during the deliberations over the new standards. 
My hypothesis is that California had a greater interest in seeing a unified, 
national standard and preserving its existing regulatory authority but did leverage 
that authority to push federal regulators toward a high standard. 
 
The Intersection of State and Federal Regulations 
 Long before anyone was starting to pay attention to climate change, the adverse 
impact vehicles’ emissions were having on the country’s health and wellbeing was 
quickly becoming apparent, and no more so than in California. Since the rapid economic 
development and urbanization that occurred following World War 2, personal vehicles 
have become a more ubiquitous part of people’s lives. Prior to World War 2, 40 percent 
of the country didn’t own a vehicle, utilizing public transportation or other means to 
travel. Today, 95 percent of American households own a vehicle, and 85 percent of 
Americans use their vehicle to get to work.161 This growth in vehicle ownership and use 
contributed to the substantial rise in U.S. air pollution beginning in the 1940s. California, 
due to rapid industrial development and oil refinement, experienced heavy air pollution in 
places like Los Angeles162 and became the first state in the country to establish air 
pollution control districts.163 It would not be until 1955 that the federal government 
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would get involved with air quality when Congress passed the Air Pollution Control Act 
of 1955.164 While limited in scope, largely focused on research and industrial sources of 
air pollution like coal-fired power plants, it was the first of many policy steps toward 
addressing the emissions generated by the country’s rapid economic development. In 
1962, the federal government started to focus on the health impacts of vehicle exhaust, 
and in 1965 Congress passed the first law establishing emission standards for new 
vehicles, the Motor Vehicle Air Pollution Control Act. By the mid-1960s, vehicles were 
responsible for over 60 percent of the air pollutants in U.S. skies.165 It was not until 1970 
with the enactment of the federal Clean Air Act that the first major air pollution control 
standards were established, including for motor vehicles.166 
 Despite the strength of the act, which included the establishment of the U.S. EPA 
to enforce it, California was still facing extreme and unique air pollution challenges. 
During the 1970s and 1980s, peak smog levels in the Los Angeles area were five times 
higher than California’ modern air quality standards.167 By 1980, California had 12 
million vehicles being driven more than 400 million miles every day, with passenger cars 
and trucks producing seven times the nitrous oxide (NOx) pollution – a major contributor 
to smog and other air pollution – than all the power plants in the state combined.168  
                                                 
164 History of the Clean Air Act, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, last updated Aug. 15, 
2013, http://www.epa.gov/air/caa/amendments.html/. 
165 Martin V. Melosi, "The Automotive and the Environment in American History," Automobile in 
American Life and Society, last accessed Feb. 13, 2015, http://www.autolife.umd.umich.edu/Environment/ 
E_Overview/E_Overview4.htm/. 
166 "The Plain English Guide to the Clean Air Act," U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Office 
of Air Quality Planning and Standards, last modified April 2007, http://www.epa.gov/. 
167 Travis Madsen and Benjamin Davis, and Bernadette Del Chiaro, Clean Cars in California: 




Recognizing during the 1960s that it was already experiencing dangerous levels 
of emissions, California started to push “technology forcing” policies, starting with 
mandating that automakers install pollution-controlling equipment in vehicles sold in the 
state.169 By the 1970s, this approach had expanded to push automakers to develop new 
technologies to reduce emissions by setting stringent emission standards. Catalytic 
converters, oxygen sensors, and emissions control systems – technological additions that 
automakers often claimed would bankrupt them – became standard in new vehicles, and 
soon after California would set a standard for emissions, the federal government would 
follow with a comparable reduction in emissions.  
 While the federal government has the ability to regulate a national set of 
minimum standards that states must meet or exceed, it cannot force states to adopt certain 
policies or regulations. This “commandeering,” as one researcher put it, is prohibited by 
the limits of the Commerce Clause of the Constitution, as well as protected by the 
doctrine of dual sovereignty.170 These points were codified in the Supreme Court’s 
decision in New York v. United States, a case over a federal law forcing states to manage 
the disposal of radioactive waste within their borders, when it ruled “the Constitution 
enables the Federal Government to preempt state regulation contrary to federal interests, 
and it permits the Federal Government to hold out incentives to the States as a means of 
encouraging them to adopt suggested regulatory schemes. It does not, however, authorize 
Congress simply to direct the States.”171 But the court did clarify that this did not prohibit 
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the federal government from working to influence state policy. As it noted later in the 
opinion, “Where Congress has the authority to regulate private activity under the 
Commerce Clause, we have recognized Congress’ power to offer States the choice of 
regulating that activity according to federal standards or having state law pre-empted by 
federal regulation . . .This arrangement . . . has been termed “a program of cooperative 
federalism.” 
This cooperative federalism manifested in California through two exemptions in 
the Clean Air Act172 that would pave the way for the state to be a leader in clean vehicle 
technology. 173 The first, Section 209, permitted the state to set emissions standards for 
vehicles at higher levels than the federal government. Section 177 of the Act permitted 
other states’ to adopt California’s standards.174 As of 2010, thirteen states and the District 
of Columbia would become so-called “177 States,” a reference to the act’s section that 
gave California and these states this authority.175  
The idea that states pursue their own laws or regulations to put pressure on the 
federal government to take action is not a new concept, and certainly has already had 
broad applicability to environmental laws. Researchers believe this form of 
environmental federalism was instrumental in pushing the federal government to pass a 
flurry of environmental laws during the 1960s and 1970s, including the Clean Air Act 
and Clean Water Act. Prior to this time period, federal environmental regulation was 
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minimal, but states passing their own regulations can force the regulated industry to push 
for a single, national standard. But while some industries like power generators and 
manufacturers can play states against each other over where they will locate (or relocate) 
in a bid to combat environmental regulations, the automotive industry cannot use a 
similar tactic. It cannot afford to refuse selling cars to one state or another because that 
state has a higher standard for vehicle emissions, and while the industry fought emissions 
controls at first, by the mid-1960s as California was continuing to ramp up its emissions 
controls for vehicles, it was the auto industry that asking for a single, federal standard.176 
However, the dueling federal and California standards for fuel economy and 
emissions from vehicles represented what one researchers believes to be an innovative 
and promising approach to developing climate change policy known as “iterative 
federalism.” Coined by Ann Carlson, a professor at the University of California - Los 
Angeles’s School of Law, the term refers to the model that emerged out of California’s 
ability to regulate air pollution in excess of federal standards under the Clean Air Act. 
This scheme is reflective of this unique brand of federalism “where federal law 
consciously designates a particular and distinct state or group of states to regulate and 
relies on that regulatory arrangement to enhance compliance with federal standards.”177 
This authority, and the policy steps that California took, were often followed by similar 
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actions at the federal level as observed with another of California’s climate change laws, 
a low-carbon fuel standard for refiners.178 
Despite a growing public consciousness about the impact of carbon dioxide and 
other emissions that drive climate change through the 1990s, including the signing of the 
Kyoto Protocol in 1997, it would not be until 2002 with the California’s passage of 
Assembly Bill 1493, otherwise known as the “Pavley” regulations, that a regulatory body 
– state or federal – would call for standards to reduce greenhouse gas emissions in new 
passenger vehicles.179 Citing the state’s authority under the Clean Air Act to promulgate 
these standards in excess of federal standards, the law called for CARB to establish 
regulations by 2005 for reducing greenhouse gas emissions from new vehicles built 
between 2009 and 2016. Detailing the adverse impacts climate change has already had on 
the state, the bill states that "California has a long history of being the first in the nation 
to take action to protect public health and the environment, and the federal government 
has permitted the state to take those actions." It also noted that "technological solutions to 
reduce greenhouse gas emissions will stimulate the California economy and provide 
enhanced job opportunities. This will continue the California automobile worker tradition 
of building cars that use cutting edge technology." 
However, after CARB produced the new standards and the state applied to the 
EPA in December 2005 for a waiver to institute these standards, the agency stalled, 
telling the state in early 2007 that because of a pending case before the U.S. Supreme 
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Court, Massachusetts v. EPA, it could not make a decision until that case was resolved.180 
Despite the court siding with California and the other states in its decision, the EPA 
denied the waiver in March 2008 and it would not be until June 2009, after President 
Barack Obama took office and ordered the EPA to reconsider the waiver request, that it 
was ultimately approved.181 This would set the stage for the first-ever greenhouse gas 
emission standards for vehicles, but it remained be seen whether California would once 
again lead on emissions control.  
 
Fuel Economy Standards and the Rise of the National Program 
 President Obama, who had campaigned on combatting climate change, was set 
early on to make clean vehicle advancements a central part of his environmental 
agenda.182 Soon after taking office, his administration sought to chart a new path for 
establishing new greenhouse gas emission and fuel efficiency standards for new vehicles.  
 Since transportation became a growing part of the larger discussion on climate 
change, more research has been focused on how increasing fuel economy standards 
would reduce oil use and vehicle emissions,183 but the research has been mixed in its 
assessment. Transportation accounts for 12 percent of all greenhouse gas emissions 
worldwide,184 and while few would dispute that higher fuel economy standards would 
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result in lower vehicle emissions simply because it means vehicles are burning less fuel, 
there are varying views about whether fuel economy standards are the best tool for 
reducing transportation emissions and whether their implementation may be more costly 
than other carbon-reduction strategies.185 One set of researchers said that in the United 
States a fuel tax may be more effective than fuel economy standards. This is in part 
because the United States has a slow turnover of new vehicles – meaning higher fuel 
efficiency vehicles are slow to work onto U.S. roads – and because a fuel tax incentivizes 
all drivers to cut down their fuel use.186 They did note, however, that fuel economy 
standards may make more political and regulatory sense in the United States because of 
the negative reaction to higher taxes. They also said that fuel economy standards would 
have the added benefit of creating a more predictable, stable regulatory environment to 
encourage automakers to develop new clean vehicle technology “by removing some of 
the downside risks to innovators in a world of uncertain fuel prices.”  
Other researchers concluded that not only was an increase in fuel economy 
standards more effective than fuel taxes for raising vehicle fuel efficiency and reducing 
greenhouse gas emissions, but that –as vehicles become more efficient they use less fuel 
and volatility in the gasoline market is typically too short to drive automakers to make 
long-term investments in improving vehicle technology – regulation will become 
increasingly important to drive improvements in fuel efficiency.187 Another researcher 
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noted that while there has been much focus on developing next-generation vehicle 
technologies like electric and hydrogen vehicles, regular internal combustion engine 
vehicles will remain the dominant vehicles on roads for the foreseeable future, making 
regulating their fuel efficiency the more effective path for long-term reduction in 
emissions.188  
Noting that automakers have been lobbying for a national, unified vehicle 
emissions scheme since the 1960s, one researcher argued that a unified, “harmonized” 
standard not just nationally but worldwide would not only help automakers reduce their 
vehicles’ contribution to climate change, but it would also prevent against the “race to the 
bottom” mentality of market actors who, seeing multiple standards in multiple markets, 
will do the bare minimum to comply with the lowest regulation available and thus lower 
their overall impact.189  
But up until the last 20 years, reducing emissions for the sake of combatting 
climate change was not a consideration for increasing fuel efficiency standards. While 
separate federal and state-level standards had called for reducing the amount of emissions 
from a vehicle for several years, it was not until 1975 that Congress would first establish 
Corporate Average Fuel Economy, or CAFE, standards. These standards, largely 
established in the wake of the 1973 oil embargo that caused U.S. gasoline prices to 
skyrocket, set certain fuel economy standards for automakers based on the weight of their 
vehicles. These standards were intended to double average fuel economy standards to 
about 27.5 mpg by MY1985, but additional gains were long stalled due in part to 
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members of Congress who are allied with the auto industry, which claimed the standards 
would hurt U.S. competition and raise prices. Standards remained stagnant until 2007 
with the passage of the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007.190 This sweeping 
energy legislation called for the raising of fuel economy standards of new passenger 
vehicles sold in the United States – including car, light trucks, and sports utility vehicles 
– to have a combined average of about 35 mpg by 2020, with additional benchmarks set 
for later years.  
Backed by the authority under the Supreme Court’s Massachusetts v. EPA 
decision, the Obama administration sought not only to go beyond the standards set forth 
by the 2007 law but also to use the Clean Air Act to establish the first-ever federal 
greenhouse gas emission standards for new vehicles. This would require not only 
coordination between the Department of Transportation’s National Highway Traffic and 
Safety Administration (NHTSA) – which was responsible for setting fuel economy 
standards – and the EPA – which had the authority to set greenhouse gas emission 
standards – but cooperation with the state of California and the states that chose to adopt 
its vehicle emission standards. California had finally gotten its waiver from the EPA to 
set its own greenhouse gas emission standards for new vehicles under its Pavley 
regulations, but there was serious concern voiced by automakers and some members of 
Congress that continuing to have two standards for vehicles in this country – a federal 
one and one for the state of California and the states that follow its standards – would be 
                                                 





onerous for automakers. Automakers challenged California’s authority to implement its 
own standards in 2004, but the case was dismissed in 2007.191 
Still, the discontinuity remained. The Obama Administration’s solution was the 
establishment of the National Program, a coordinated effort between NTSHA, the EPA, 
and California to work collaboratively to establish a single standard for greenhouse gas 
emissions and fuel economy standards for new vehicles.192 “Car companies might then 
face three different sets of overlapping requirements, one administered by the Department 
of Transportation, one administered by the EPA, and still a third administered by 
California and 13 other states,” President Obama said as he announced the National 
Program, referring to the two sets of greenhouse gas emissions standards managed at the 
federal level by EPA and the California level by CARB but the single, national fuel 
economy standards managed by NHTSA. “This proposed national policy, under the 
leadership of two agencies – and bringing together 14 states, 10 companies, as well as 
auto workers and environmental groups – changes all that.”193 
Noting that mobile sources accounted for 31 percent of greenhouse gas emissions 
in the United States in 2007 and was the fastest-growing source of said emissions in the 
United States since 1990, the EPA and NHTSA said this phase of the standards – which 
would cover MY2012-2016 and call for a fleetwide average of 34.1 mpg – would reduce 
                                                 
191 Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emissions Standards, Center for Climate and Energy Solutions, 
updated May 20, 2013, http://www.c2es.org/sites/default/modules/usmap/pdf.php?file=5905/. 
192 EPA and NHTSA Propose Historic National Program to Reduce Greenhouse Gases and 
Improve Fuel Economy for Cars and Trucks, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Office of 
Transportation and Air Quality, September 2009, http://www.epa.gov/otaq/ 
climate/regulations/420f09047a.pdf/. 
193 Barack Obama, "Remarks by the President on National Fuel Efficiency Standards," (speech 
delivered at the White House, Washington, D.C., May 19, 2009). 
68 
 
U.S. greenhouse gas emissions by about 21 percent by 2030 below the level that would 
have been generated without the program.194  
This plan, proposed in 2009 and finalized in 2010, was quietly orchestrated and 
supported by the federal government, the state of California, automakers, environmental 
groups, and the United Auto Workers.195 As President Obama noted at the announcement 
of the standard, because the federal government and the state of California were working 
together on these standards, “we will avoid an inefficient and ineffective system of 
regulations that separately govern the fuel economy of autos and the carbon emissions 
they produce.” 
 But this was only the first of what would be two phases for the National Program. 
While the first phase largely lined up the new, unified standards196 with the existing fuel 
efficiency goals established by the 2007 federal law (albeit on a shorter timetable) and the 
greenhouse gas emission standards established by California’s Pavley regulations,197 the 
second phase would shoot for much higher goals, and the question became whether 
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California Stays the Regulatory Elephant in the Room 
 The events leading up to the new round of standards showed that while California 
was deeply interested in a higher standard, it was more interested in a strong, national 
standard and preserving its own regulatory authority, and thus did not stake itself 
publically on what kind of standard it wanted.  
In May 2010, just a few months after the announcement of the new standards, 
President Obama instructed NHTSA and EPA to work with CARB to develop a new set 
of standards that would cover MY2017-2025.198 The move was expected, with some 
advocates already proposing new levels the administration could achieve with a new 
standard.199 While the instruction did not include a specific number in mind, it emerged 
later that fall that the agencies were considering more than 60 mpg-equivalent by 2025, 
more than double the newly finalized standards.200 
The new goals came at a difficult time for the administration. While the first 
phase of standards were proposed within the first year of the administration at a time 
when the president’s popularity was high and political opposition was minimal, by the 
time the administration had begun discussing the next phase of standards, there had been 
a lot of changes to the political climate. The highly contentious deliberation of what 
would become the Affordable Care Act significantly weakened public support for the 
president’s initiatives, and the slow defeat of the federal climate bill that passed the 
House but died in the Senate slowed national momentum for taking any sort of climate 
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change action.201 To make the next round a success, the administration would need to 
have the same kind of unified cooperation across all parties that made the first phase such 
a success.  
That includes the state of California, which was initially supportive of the federal 
climate change bill in the House but expressed serious concerns it would undermine the 
state’s own efforts to combat climate change.202 As the House-passed bill died in the 
Senate, California was in the midst of its rulemaking process for implementing its own 
climate law, which requires California to get its greenhouse gas levels down to 1990 
levels by 2020, about a 15 percent reduction in emissions.203 Reductions in vehicle 
emissions were crucial to that goal, and while the work to reduce these emissions was 
already underway and coordinated in part with the federal government on the first round 
of standards, if the second round was not as aggressive as the state wanted, it could opt to 
do its own, higher standard.   
Coordinating these efforts, including their timelines, was crucial to making this 
endeavor a success. While California has the authority to regulate greenhouse gases from 
vehicles in excess of federal standards, it does not have any authority to set fuel economy 
standards, which can only be set at the federal level. This meant that the federal 
government wanted to have a single, national standard for vehicles, California would 
have to align its rulemaking process for emissions with the timeline of the federal 
emissions and fuel economy standards.  
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California had already announced its plan to propose its 2017-2025 emission 
standards by March 2011, but EPA and NHTSA’s timeline for generating the emissions 
and fuel economy standards wouldn’t come until the end of that September, meaning 
California could potentially come out with a higher emissions standard that could force 
federal regulators to set their own rules at that level – whether the wanted to or not – in 
order to have a national standard. This gave California an edge, but it also created an 
opening for attack. 
Even before the announcement that California and the federal government would 
work together, California was already in a fight with automakers over their ability to 
regulate emissions. On January 11, the automotive industry’s main trade group – the 
Alliance of Auto Manufacturers – sent a letter to members of Congress accusing 
California of rushing their process to produce an emissions rule, which in the group’s 
opinion "is not in the spirit of a collaborative effort to develop a single national program 
for fuel economy/greenhouse gas (greenhouse gas) standards."204 
In a joint announcement later that month, the EPA, DOT, and CARB announced 
they would align their timelines for rulemaking to work together to propose a new round 
of standard for MY2017-2025. While California lauded the previous collaboration 
leading to higher, overall emissions standards, this commitment only extended to 
reviewing the same set of data and coming out with their proposals at about the same 
time, not to agreeing to set the same standard.205  
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California took issue with the letter, with CARB Chairman Mary D. Nichols 
writing the CEOs of seven major auto manufacturers directly to take them to task for 
their trade group’s accusations. "For the Alliance to suggest we are no longer committed 
to a cooperative effort is disingenuous at best, and incorrect," she wrote, adding that the 
automakers should "distance" themselves from the group.206  
Still, California’s unique authority got the attention of congressional Republicans, 
including House Energy and Commerce Committee Chairman Fred Upton. That March, 
Upton – a Republican from Michigan and a longtime advocate of the auto industry – 
introduced legislation to block the Obama administration’s ability to regulate greenhouse 
gases, including its authority to give California the waivers it needs under the Clean Air 
Act to implement higher vehicle emissions standards, claiming the overall bill would 
thwart this “backdoor attempt by unelected bureaucrats” to try to create a regulatory 
version of the climate bill that died in the Senate the previous year.207  There was 
companion legislation in the Senate, and while the bills had little chance of becoming law 
with Democrats in control in the Senate and the White House, Californians were fiercely 
critical of the bill and defensive of their authority to regulate vehicle emissions, with 
CARB spokesman Stanley Young calling it a “shocking attack on states’ rights and on 
public health.” 208 
The debate over the state’s ability to tackle climate change came at an interesting 
time for California. The state had just finished deciding on Proposition 23, a hotly 
contested but ultimately unsuccessful ballot initiative the previous year to suspend the 
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state’s climate law.209 It had also won an important legal victory. That April, the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia rejected a legal challenge to California’s 
authority to set its own emissions standard for vehicles sold in the state. The suit, brought 
by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and the National Automotive Dealers Association, 
contended that dueling federal and California standards would hurt businesses, but the 
court said the groups lacked standing and could not demonstrate how the group’s 
respective members would be harmed by the new standards.210 The court noted that 
“Even if EPA's decision to grant California a waiver for its emissions standards once 
posed an imminent threat of injury to the petitioners, which is far from clear, the agency's 
subsequent adoption of federal standards has eliminated any independent threat that may 
have existed.”211 In effect, both these developments only further solidified for California 
that tackling climate change in whatever matter it saw fit was an affirmed state right.  
Support for higher fuel economy standards, which would help achieve these 
emission levels, was growing in 2011 as consumers faced rising gas prices. A report by 
the Consumer Federation of America found that the average American household would 
likely pay a record $2,832 in fuel costs that year, more than most Americans would spend 
on car payments during the same year. The report showed nearly two-thirds of Americans 
favored a 60-mpg-or-greater standard, with support even higher amongst lower-income 
families.212  
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This report would be one of many from the myriad of environmental, consumer, 
national security, and health groups making the case for the administration to set the new 
standard at the highest technically feasible level, about 60 mpg. Since the analysis and 
determination of how high to set the standards at the federal and California level were 
occurring behind the bureaucratic curtain, advocates on both sides were trying to make 
their respective cases to the public, which included the very same individuals that would 
decide the standards.  
Several of the advocacy groups pushing for the higher standard – including the 
Sierra Club, Environment America, and the Union of Concerned Scientists – launched 
Go60MPG, a D.C. public advocacy campaign to drum up public support for the highest 
possible standard that included radio and print ads, rapid analysis, and reporter outreach.  
The outreach was not just focused on the federal level, but also on California. A 
report by the American Lung Association found that if California were to set the highest 
possible standard, the air pollution reductions would prevent hundreds of premature 
deaths and billions of dollars in health care costs and damages,213 while another report by 
Next 10 – a nonprofit research organization – found that 326,000 new jobs would come 
to the state if it went with the highest possible standard.214  
Opponents were also pulling out their analytical chops against the standard. The 
Center for Automotive Research, a research group based in Michigan, issued a report 
claiming that the highest standard would add $9,000 to the cost of a new vehicle,215 but 
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proponents criticized the report for relying on faulty methodology216 (NTSHA and EPA’s 
own technical assessment put the level much lower and said fuel savings would exceed 
these costs over the lifetime of the vehicle217) and painted the group as beholden to the 
auto industry.218 Opponents got some traction for their efforts, with one member of 
Congress successfully getting an amendment attached to the Interior and Environment 
Appropriations bill that would prohibit EPA from spending its funds to either produce 
fuel economy standards or allow California to do so.219 
While the amendment would not go anywhere in the end, the barrage of reports, 
ads, and legislative efforts came at a crucial time for this effort. According to a story in 
the Los Angeles Times written several months after the announcement of the new 
standards, round-the-clock negotiations started around mid-June to determine what would 
be the final standard.220 Automakers asserted it was not technologically feasible to reach 
anything higher than 55 mpg by 2025, and called for a slower pace of increases for gas-
guzzling vehicles like SUVs and trucks, as well as a review halfway between 2017 and 
2025 to evaluate progress and see whether automakers were on track to reach the 2025 
goal or abandon it all together. California and environmentalists, worried this would 
allow automakers to drag their heels until this midterm review, balked.221 Less than two 
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weeks before the standards would be announced, the Alliance for Automotive 
Manufacturers was set to start running a two-week radio ad campaign in California and 
several other states but cancelled the ads just before they were set to run only to start 
running them a day later.222 The ads claimed that “families would be hit with higher car 
prices,” and “small businesses dependent on vans, SUVs or pickups would face limited 
vehicle choices” because of the new standards, suggesting that the parties were still at 
odds in the negotiations. 
Despite these efforts, the Obama administration, California, automakers, and the 
other parties involved reached an agreement, and a few days later at an event in 
Washington, D.C., flanked by executives from America’s leading auto companies, 
President Obama announced the new standard of 54.5 mpg-equivalent by 2025, near the 
top of the feasibility range.  
While proponents celebrated the new standards, the deal did give some 
concessions to automakers that would both keep the greenhouse gas reductions while 
giving more credit to the industry for technologies that would cut down on their total 
power use, specifically vehicles’ air conditioning systems. They also agreed to a midterm 
review in 2021 that would force heavy fuel vehicles like trucks to make large gains in 
fuel economy, but only after the review.  
Speaking to the myriad of different parties that were involved in the development 
of these rules, the president said “You all are demonstrating what can happen when 
people put aside differences. These folks are competitors. You got labor and business. 
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But they decided, 'We are going to work together to achieve something important and 
lasting for the country,'"223 to which California Governor Jerry Brown said, upon 
announcement of the standard: “President Obama’s bold action today marks a major 
advance towards a more sustainable environment and less oil-dependent economy.” 
Noting that in his former position as California’s attorney general he sued the Bush 
administration could the state could enact the standards for while the federal standards 
are based, he said that “California led the way, and all Californians can be proud that 
President Obama adopted our state’s forward-thinking policy as a model for the 
nation."224 
 
Recommendations and Conclusion 
There are a few lessons about the deliberations over the new standards and 
California’s role in them that other states could learn from if they choose to pursue their 
own collaboration with the federal government on climate-related policies. 
 The first is that nearly all parties, regardless of how they felt, were at least willing 
to be a part of the conversation. Aside from the National Automotive Dealers Association 
and its allies in Congress that wanted nothing more than to block EPA and California 
from producing any new standard, each stakeholder– while holding to their predictable 
position – was engaged in the conversation and contributing to it in one way or another. 
While the narrow, absolutist approach may invigorate diehards, it also alienates them 
from the conversation with other stakeholders that have very different opinions but want 
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to move forward collectively. This did not happen overnight. It was the result of years of 
discussions, analysis, and relationship building to bring parties that just a few years 
before would not have sat down at a negotiating table with each other, much less worked 
together on an agreement.  
 The second key lesson is also related to that willingness to work together also 
comes with it a second key lesson: the parties that would ultimately decide these 
standards – EPA, CARB, and NHTSA – stayed open to all options, and even if a specific 
party has a preferred option, they did not voice it publically. The federal government, 
rather than laying out one option, gave a range of possible targets for 2025, providing 
breathing room for debate amongst the different parties. There were no specific 
statements discovered throughout this research made by California officials that explicitly 
declared that the state had a desire to use its authority to its fullest extent regardless of the 
process. While that may have provided some leverage at the negotiating table, it would 
have also painted the state into a corner, forcing them to hold to a specific level and risk 
appearing as a holdout in a collaborative process or conceding and looking like it 
acquiesced to automakers. Rather than holding to specific levels and digging in, parties 
on both sides provided ranges, creating the negotiating space needed for both sides to 
appear flexible and come to an agreement together.   
 That flexibility is the third, and perhaps most important reason for this success, 
because it involves weighing the cold, hard facts of analysis with other, sometimes less 
intrinsic factors. While the EPA and CARB’s analyses indicated that it was possible to 
get as high as 60 mpg or greater by 2025, California and the federal government 
recognized that in order to have a single, standardized national standard, they would need 
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to have the automakers as partners. Were they to box them out of the negotiations or 
simply set the standards as high as they wanted even after consulting them, it would 
likely only likely lead them to more litigation, debate, and stymied progress in getting 
automakers to evolve their vehicles. By giving concessions like the midterm review and a 
less-than-ideal proposed standard, it made the very parties that would have to bear the 
brunt of this new standard a stakeholder in the process, rather than subject to it.   
 Ultimately, California’s interest very likely could have been beyond its borders. 
Had California decided to go ahead with its own standards and bring with them the other 
states that choose to go with the California standard over the federal standard, there could 
have been greater reductions in greenhouse gases nationwide, but the state and the 
country needed to have automakers as partners in this process, not enemies. The 
concession to work together on the standards through 2025 sets the benchmark for a 
partnership that will lead to meaningful steps towards tackling climate change, which has 
been a longstanding goal of California. If states are going to rely on a regulatory 
approach for pushing climate-related policies, taking the additional time to make the 
different parties partners in the regulatory process rather than recipients will make the 
process more productive and ultimately lead to more effective action.  
 Speaking a year later when the rulemaking process finished at the federal level, 
CARB spokesman Stanley Young said California was preparing to finalize its own 
standards. While the federal standard was already complete, “the Air Resources Board 
staff prepared a separate resolution for consideration by the full board that deems the 
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federal program to be equivalent to that of California … We retain our own program, but 
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A global threat like climate change needs a global solution. The United Nations 
provides the venue to craft that solution, but the participation in that solution must be at 
the national level. To continue failing to enact a nationwide climate policy is to ignore 
this global threat. Local, state and regional governments are doing what they can to fill 
the void left by this lack of policy, but until there is either a national policy or a policy 
that coordinates all these state and local efforts so that they are most effective, the impact 
of these subnational efforts may be minimal at best.  
 Indeed, several studies have found that the subnational, federalist structure of the 
United States, compared to other nations like Canada, makes it less able for a state to 
enact comprehensive policies because those subnational governments may not have the 
political or analytical capacity to craft effective policies or coordinate them with other 
entities.226 They also lack the authority to sign on to trans-national climate agreements.227 
But the fact that the American political structure is markedly different than other 
countries doesn’t mean that its subnational governments cannot enact climate policies. 
Research has found that support for local action on climate change appears to be 
transnational,228 but other studies have noted that while local governments can take 
action, regardless of nationality, their policy options are limited.229  
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Still, there is a demonstrated willingness by states to take action. This thesis 
sought to explore that. Specifically, if the states have the will to take on climate change, 
what might be the best policies and tactics for pursuing them? 
Chapter One examined the development of the first state-level cap-and-trade 
policy passed by a state legislature. While similar in many ways to other cap-and-trade 
regimes in Europe and the United States, it was the first to be passed by a state 
legislature. For California, a traditionally progressive state with a long history of leading 
the nation on environmental policies, there were still a myriad of factors that had to line 
up for it to be a success, including a political climate that is more conducive to taking on 
a large and revolutionary regulatory regime, a significant amount of groundwork both to 
establish the existing policy precedent and to time their action for when there was high 
public awareness and support for taking action on climate change. It also required the 
willingness of both sides to compromise, and emphasizing that this kind of environmental 
leadership was part of California's identity. Only with these factors combined did 
California’s AB 32 become law.  
Chapter Two reviewed the failed attempt by environmentalists to include a strong 
RES in a state constitution. Michigan’s failed Proposal 3 was a gamble, one that required 
a strong argument in favor of the constitutional merits of the proposal that they found 
themselves unprepared to defend. While opponents did argue that Proposal 3 would be 
costly, both sides agreed that renewable energy development would be great for 
Michigan. It was not the merits, but the method of its enactment that downed Proposal 3. 
The tactic of proponents to use the state constitution to effect an incremental policy 
change rather than a statement of fact, combined with its vagueness, the timing of the 
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proposal, and proponents’ inability to defend why a constitutional amendment was the 
only option for this policy led to the defeat of AB 32.  
While the first two chapters dealt with policies that were decided at least in part 
by the public – AB 32 by legislators that have to respond to voters’ concerns and 
Proposal 3 that was decided entirely by voters – Chapter Three analyzed a policy route 
whereby the public was almost entirely removed from the deliberations. California’s 
decision whether to use its own regulatory authority to raise global warming and fuel 
economy standards for vehicles sold in the state as it had done many times before or go 
along with a lesser, federal standard removed the general public almost entirely from the 
deliberations. There were a variety of voices on both sides of the debate, including the 
administration, the state, automakers, environmentalists, labor leaders and health experts, 
engaged together in a collaborative process to determine the best standard possible. 
While the regulatory route may seem like a sure-fire win for proponents of these 
standards, it requires a great deal of coordination, relationship building, and willingness 
by all parties to reach an equitable solution for it to become a reality, in addition to 
certain federal conditions that made it possible for California to have authority to exceed 
federal standards. Even under this ideal situation, it was still a tough fight, one under 
continuous threat by those outside the process – including some members of Congress – 
that were hell-bent on torpedoing the effort regardless of its benefits, as well as those 
inside the process – especially California – that had considerable leverage over the 
outcome. However, success through the regulatory process, while shielded from most of 
the political and social factors that affect other policy routes, is by no means a guarantee 
for success.  
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Limitations and Opportunities for Additional Research 
 While there are many lessons to be learned from these three policies and the 
policy routes they took, there are several questions left unanswered by this thesis that 
could benefit from additional research.  
 One of the biggest impacts on the outcomes of these cases not extensively 
explored in this thesis was the role of advertising. There were ads aired by both sides 
during the deliberations of all three proposals that varied greatly in their reach, tone, and 
expense. Spending for Michigan’s Proposal 3 was amongst the highest in the nation for a 
ballot initiative during the 2012 election, much of it on advertising. This thesis does not 
go into detail about the relative financial abilities of the different players in these debates, 
but the strong sway of public opinion against Proposal 3 through the course of the 
election illustrates just how much of an impact advertising could have potentially affected 
how individuals perceived those proposals. Additional research could explore the 
permeation of those advertising-driven messages through different media, how it affected 
different demographics in the public, and whether the messages in the ads were different 
than the ones used by the policy entrepreneurs themselves.  
 Another opportunity for additional research that was only slightly explored in this 
thesis was just how much the opinion of average citizens and even the policy 
entrepreneurs themselves on climate change was informed by personal experience and 
awareness of the impact it was having on their states. Understanding peoples’ personal 
awareness of climate change’s impact on their own state is crucial to understanding how 
they perceive its threat and thus their support for taking state-level action.  
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This thesis also focused exclusively on state-level action, but counties, cities, and 
small towns throughout the country have sought to also take their own action to curb 
climate change and mitigate its impacts. Examining how these actions and the policy 
entrepreneurs behind them can help to better understand how their work influenced those 
on the state level to act on these policies. 
 There were also some limitations to this research. The choice to use California as 
an example in two of the chapters led to less variety in the types of political climates 
explored, but was deemed necessary because it was more important for this research to 
focus on the different policy routes states have at their disposal. Because California has 
been more of a battleground for action on climate change, there were greater 
opportunities for analysis. Hopefully, if other states take similar action, it could yield 
different case studies that could be used to broaden this research.   
 For both proposals explored in Chapters 1 and 3, much of the negotiations over 
the bill happened behind closed doors, requiring a heavy reliance on secondary sources 
and making it difficult to ascertain many of the specific issues that were deliberated and 
whether the positions expressed in those negotiations were of the same fervor as they 
played out in the press. Future researchers could conduct records requests and detailed 
interviews with the participants in these negotiations to shed a better light on how these 
policies developed. 
 
Recommendations: Regulation and Education 
 So what, if any, of these policy routes explored is the best answer for the states? 
While there is always room for public debate, the further away a process is able to get 
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from the mess of public opinion on climate change, the better. Regulatory work that is 
open to public debate but less susceptible to the whims of an uneducated and fickle 
public is not just the best path but – absent a major change in the political tone around the 
issue – it may be the only path forward for the foreseeable future. This is not an easy task, 
as most states’ regulatory actions are dictated or at least driven, in part, by the sitting 
governor, meaning that a state may be less likely to move forward a climate-related 
policy if the governor is opposed to it. Additionally, some states may not have the 
appropriate regulatory body or capacity to produce these policies, and even if a state does 
have a capable regulatory body, ultimately enactment of those polices may still fall to the 
governor or state legislature. Still, the process of proposing, developing, and 
implementing regulations backed by law allows for public involvement through 
comments and scoping hearings but is deliberative and insular enough so that only those 
who are well-versed on the topic and passionate about getting involved in it are able to 
have a seat at the table. This of course may change as more and more people are educated 
on climate change and more states take a greater leadership role with their own action.  
 But what role, if any, do these states’ policies have in a federal climate strategy? 
While the scholarship has extensively explored the potential for these bottom-up 
approaches to combating and adapting to climate change, few claimed that this approach 
is the best. Indeed, other research found that neither a bottom-up nor a top-down 
approach is tenable in the long run, suggesting that in order to be most effective, 
collaboration between subnational and national authorities is essential to maximizing the 
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effectiveness of these policies.230 Until Congress is more willing to engage on this issue, 
state and national climate policy entrepreneurs will have to rely on regulatory options 
under the administration’s existing authority to make the states themselves greater 
partners in the development and implementation of a climate strategy.  
In many ways, at the time of this thesis’s submission, this approach is already 
playing out. President Obama benefits from broad authority granted to him by the Clean 
Air Act and legal precedent, making anything beyond that authority difficult because it 
would require Congress to grant that authority first, but it has the added benefit of 
creating a policy space in which these subnational actors like the states can take a greater 
leadership role in the implementation of these different strategies or the implementation 
of their own. This action could collectively serve to lay the groundwork for more national 
action. 
 While President Obama sought a solution from Congress during his first term, 
including supporting the 2009 failed cap-and-trade bill, his administration has since relied 
increasingly on a regulatory approach. When the research on this thesis first began in 
2012, President Obama had been quiet on climate change during his campaign for 
reelection, a very different change in tone from just four years before when he called it “a 
security threat, an economic albatross, and a moral challenge of our time."231 But in 2013, 
with his second and final term as president secured, the president told Congress that if it 
                                                 
230 Stephanie Amaru and Netra Chhetri, “Climate Adaptation: Institutional Response to 
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Approaches,” Applied Geography 39(2013): 128-139. 
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would not act, he would,232 and in June he did just that with the unveiling of his climate 
action plan, which among other things ordered the EPA to work with states and industry 
to reduce carbon emissions from existing power plants. The plan sets targets for the states 
and allows them to determine how it will best meet those targets, including the right 
balance of shuttering old, dirty plants with investments in cleaner technologies.233 
Ultimately, the solution may not be with the states but with the nation as a whole 
with a greater emphasis on education and advocacy about the need to address climate 
change. Regardless of the limited effectiveness of these state-level policies, which 
opponents say does not justify the potential costs of these policies when other high-
carbon emitting countries like China and India are continuing unabated, the reality is 
climate change is already a reality. 
The United Nations’ Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change released a 
report in 2014 from a group of hundreds of climate change from around the world that 
concluded that human-driven climate change is "unequivocal," with each of the previous 
three decades warming than the last and the effects of that warming already underway, 
including rising sea levels, reduced crop yields, more frequent and intense severe 
weather, and species disruption.234 The report concluded that nations now must limit 
emissions not to prevent climate change but to mitigate it while forwarding adaption 
policies to minimize its effects.  
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The report emphasized that no single policy from one actor would solve this 
problem. “Climate change has the characteristics of a collective action problem at the 
global scale, because most GHGs accumulate over time and mix globally, and emissions 
by any agent (e.g., individual, community, company, country) affect other agents,” 
according to a summary of the report for policymakers. “Effective mitigation will not be 
achieved if individual agents advance their own interests independently. Cooperative 
responses, including international cooperation, are therefore required to effectively 
mitigate GHG emissions and address other climate change issues.”235 
While challenging due to the issue being increasingly defined along political 
ideology and the difficulty to tie a gradual environmental changes and severe weather 
events to climate change, both states and the country need to initiate a sustained public 
education campaign to help build public awareness and support for broader, 
comprehensive action.  
 
Conclusion 
 At the time of this thesis’s submission in May 2015, Senate Majority Leader 
Mitch McConnell was attempting to marshal governors across the country to oppose 
President Obama’s planned caps on emissions for existing power plants.236 Because 
McConnell, a Kentucky Republican whose state is the third-largest coal producer in the 
country,237 does not have many legislative options for a bill to limit the EPA’s actions, he 
                                                 
235 Ibid. 
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Lexington Herald-Leader, March 3, 2015. 
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is making his case directly to the governors arguing that they should not comply with the 
regulatory action. But as the New York Times noted in its editorial slamming the move by 
McConnell, “Governors who follow his advice may not get the result they want, since, 
under time-honored environmental law, noncompliant states could face imposition of a 
blanket federal alternative that is not tailored to local conditions.”238 McConnell’s action 
assumes the states would want to outright reject the action by the administration, and 
while there are certainly some states opposed to this proposal, the fact of the matter is 
that, whether the federal government takes action or not, more and more states are ready 
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